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Security audit

WebChat HTTPS Proxy

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly does what it advertises, but its persistent HTTPS proxy has weak authentication that can expose the local transcription service if LAN access is enabled.

Review this before installing if you plan to expose the proxy beyond localhost. It creates a persistent user systemd service and changes OpenClaw allowed origins. Keep VOICE_HOST on 127.0.0.1 unless you understand the LAN risk, and avoid putting gateway tokens in URLs or shell commands where they may be logged. This does not look malicious, but the authentication weakness should be fixed before trusting it on a shared network.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
assets/https-server.py:84
Finding

Authentication Bypass on the Transcription Proxy Endpoint

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (14)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 141, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · assets/https-server.py (reported line 149)May include surrounding context.

python
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
        resp = await loop.run_in_executor(
            None,
            lambda: urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=120),
        )
        data = resp.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BODY + 1)
        if len(data) > MAX_RESPONSE_BODY:

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.sh (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "[1/4] Stopping and removing openclaw-voice-https.service..."
systemctl --user stop openclaw-voice-https.service 2>/dev/null || true
systemctl --user disable openclaw-voice-https.service 2>/dev/null || true
rm -f "$HOME/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-voice-https.service"
systemctl --user daemon-reload 2>/dev/null || true
echo "      done."

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.sh (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

sh
rm -rf "$CERT_DIR"
  echo "      removed: $CERT_DIR"
fi
rm -f "$VOICE_DIR/https-server.py"
rmdir "$VOICE_DIR" 2>/dev/null && echo "      removed: $VOICE_DIR" || true

echo ""

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises meaningful capabilities including environment access, file modification, shell execution, persistence, and network exposure, but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens reviewability and policy enforcement because operators cannot easily constrain what the skill is allowed to do, especially given that it installs a persistent HTTPS proxy and modifies config files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
- VOICE_ALLOWED_ORIGIN (optional, default: https://<VOICE_HOST>:<VOICE_HTTPS_PORT>)
  persistence:
    - "User systemd service: openclaw-voice-https.service (HTTPS/WSS proxy)"
  privileges: user-level only, no root/sudo required
  dependencies:
    - python3 with aiohttp >= 3.9.0 (pip)
    - openssl (for self-signed cert generation)

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

md
### TLS
- **TLS 1.2+ enforced**: Minimum protocol version set to TLS 1.2. Legacy SSL/TLS 1.0/1.1 rejected.
- **Self-signed TLS**: Auto-generated certificate. Browser certificate warning on first access.
- **Private key permissions**: `chmod 600` on TLS key file.

### Authentication
- **Bearer token auth**: `/transcribe` endpoint validates Bearer token against gateway auth token using constant-time comparison (`hmac.compare_digest`).

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill establishes persistence via a user systemd service that starts automatically on boot/login. Persistence is not inherently malicious in infrastructure software, but it is security-relevant because it creates a long-lived network-facing proxy whose exposure may outlast user awareness, particularly if VOICE_HOST is set to a LAN IP.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

md
- No telemetry, analytics, or phone-home behavior.

### Persistence
- User systemd service starts on boot. Use `uninstall.sh` to fully revert.

## What this skill modifies

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Creating and enabling a persistent user-level systemd unit is a genuine persistence mechanism. In this skill's context the purpose appears operational, but the behavior still increases attack surface because it ensures the HTTPS proxy remains active across sessions and may continue exposing local services if misconfigured.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

md
| What | Path | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Gateway config | `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` | Adds HTTPS origin to `gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins` |
| Systemd service | `~/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-voice-https.service` | Creates + enables persistent HTTPS proxy |
| Runtime file | `~/.openclaw/workspace/voice-input/https-server.py` | Copies proxy server |
| TLS certs | `~/.openclaw/workspace/voice-input/certs/` | Auto-generated self-signed cert on first run |

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · assets/https-server.py (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

python
return explicit
    try:
        # Safe: fixed argument list, no user input, no shell=True
        npm_root = subprocess.check_output(["npm", "-g", "root"], text=True, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).strip()
        candidate = os.path.join(npm_root, "openclaw", "dist", "control-ui")
        if os.path.isdir(candidate):
            return candidate

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · assets/https-server.py (reported line 300)May include surrounding context.

python
return

    # Safe: fixed argument list, no user input, no shell=True
    subprocess.run([
        "openssl", "req", "-x509", "-nodes", "-newkey", "rsa:2048",
        "-keyout", str(key_path),
        "-out", str(cert_path),

Tainted flow: 'key_path' from os.environ.get (line 293, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · assets/https-server.py (reported line 300)May include surrounding context.

python
return

    # Safe: fixed argument list, no user input, no shell=True
    subprocess.run([
        "openssl", "req", "-x509", "-nodes", "-newkey", "rsa:2048",
        "-keyout", str(key_path),
        "-out", str(cert_path),

Unsafe Defaults

Medium
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · assets/https-server.py (reported line 308)May include surrounding context.

python
"-subj", "/CN=openclaw-voice-local",
    ], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)

    # SECURITY: Ensure private key is not group/world-readable
    os.chmod(str(key_path), 0o600)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting guidance instructs users to place gateway tokens directly in a URL query string and in CLI arguments. These tokens can be exposed through browser history, server and proxy logs, shell history, process listings, and screenshots or copied commands, increasing the chance of credential leakage and unauthorized access to the gateway.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/deploy.sh (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

sh
UNIT

systemctl --user daemon-reload
systemctl --user enable --now openclaw-voice-https.service
systemctl --user restart openclaw-voice-https.service

# 5) Restart gateway so allowedOrigins applies