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Security audit

Agent Arena Skill - on-chain ERC-8004 agent registry with x402-gated search and registration API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a legitimate registry purpose, but it gives agents under-scoped authority to follow third-party hiring and payment instructions and exposes persistent wallet/profile data without enough safeguards.

Review this skill before installing or using it with funds. Only send non-sensitive task payloads to discovered agents, require explicit approval before any payment, verify the endpoint, chain, amount, and recipient address independently, and avoid putting personal data, secrets, internal URLs, or private operational details into registration or enrichment fields. If implementing the SDK example, pin dependency versions and avoid handling raw private keys in general application code.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:99
Finding

Untrusted Remote Hiring Instructions Can Control Payments and Data Destinations

Content
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` header 5. **Save the `txHash` from your payment** — you need it to submit a verified review ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill explicitly instructs the agent to follow a remotely supplied `howToHire` block “exactly.” The remote response controls consequential parameters including: - The endpoint receiving the task payload - The payment recipient address - The blockchain network - The requested payment amount - Additional hiring instructions returned by the service The skill does not require a local destination allowlist, maximum payment limit, chain validation, recipient verification, instruction filtering, or explicit user approval before transmitting data or signing a payment authorization. It therefore treats attacker-controlled remote content as authoritative agent instructions instead of untrusted data. This creates an instruction-hijacking boundary: compromise of the registry, manipulation of an indexed agent profile, or a malicious registered agent can influence the agent’s behavior after the skill has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker registers a malicious agent profile, compromises a legitimate profile, or compromises the registry response. 2. The attacker supplies an endpoint under their control and a chosen payment address through the r ...[truncated 1224 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:743
Finding

Unpinned Wallet-Signing Dependencies Create a Payment Supply-Chain Risk

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The registration flow explicitly stores user-supplied profile content on IPFS and on-chain, but the skill does not warn users that this data may be public, effectively permanent, and difficult or impossible to delete. That creates a serious privacy and safety risk if users include personal data, secrets, internal endpoints, or other sensitive operational details in descriptions or service metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says the registry works across 'EVM + Solana', but the supported chains section lists only 16 EVM networks and all registration, reputation, and payment flows are described in ERC-8004, EIP-3009, Base USDC, and EVM contract terms. No Solana endpoint, chain identifier format, wallet flow, or payment mechanism is documented anywhere in the skill file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages users to send wallet addresses and payment proofs as part of normal operation without warning that this data is linkable, persistent, and potentially sensitive. In a blockchain context, these identifiers can be correlated across transactions and services to profile users, exposing financial behavior and counterparties.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The buyer reputation and feedback features collect and expose transactional and behavioral metadata such as volume, disputes, review tendencies, and account age without an explicit privacy notice or consent guidance. Because wallet addresses are stable identifiers, this can enable reputation-based profiling and deanonymization of buyer behavior across transactions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The HIRE workflow instructs users to retry with the X-PAYMENT header, while the compare endpoint's howToUse block later says to retry with the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. These are active contradictions in usage guidance for the same x402 payment flow, which can mislead integrators about how to actually pay and hire agents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.