Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed setup guide for multi-agent OpenClaw deployments, but users should handle credentials and persistent memory carefully.
Install only if you want a multi-agent OpenClaw blueprint. When applying it, use least-privilege bot/API/SSH credentials, keep secrets out of agent files and memory, restrict Telegram access with allowlists and mentions, and define retention/deletion rules for persistent memory.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
*Social agents can use specialized providers like xAI/Grok for platform-native tone.
# For each agent:
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
}
### 4. Create Agent Files
Each agent needs 4 files in their `agentDir`:
The document recommends storing API keys in .env files and centralizing SSH/NAS credentials in a single agent, but it omits basic safeguards such as least privilege, file permission hardening, rotation, segregation by agent, and avoiding exposure through logs or memory. Because this blueprint is for multi-agent deployments with cross-agent routing and external integrations, weak credential handling could lead to broader compromise if one workspace, agent, or host is exposed.
The skill explicitly instructs agents to persist 'key decisions, dates, and action items' into memory files before session compaction, but it does not warn that these files may contain sensitive or regulated data and will survive session resets. In a multi-agent environment handling finance, health, contracts, and personal data, this creates a realistic risk of over-retention, unintended disclosure, and sensitive context being resurfaced later via memory search.