Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md _SECRET"],"bins":["python3","curl"]},"os":["macos","linux","win32"],"files":["SKILL.md"],"emoji":"💰"}}
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is not visibly malicious, but it asks for broad financial and reporting access without enough scoping or safety guidance.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Use test or read-only credentials where possible, limit each API key to the minimum required permissions, avoid sharing full financial reports to broad Slack channels, and confirm any Airtable or Slack destination before enabling recurring reports.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
_SECRET"],"bins":["python3","curl"]},"os":["macos","linux","win32"],"files":["SKILL.md"],"emoji":"💰"}}
The manifest declares only Stripe and PayPal secrets plus basic binaries, but the body documents additional integrations including Google Analytics, Slack, Airtable, WordPress, affiliate platforms, and other external services. This mismatch can mislead users and reviewers about the true data-access scope, making informed consent, least-privilege review, and sandbox policy decisions harder for a skill handling sensitive financial data.
The skill encourages users to connect financial accounts and automate reports to Slack without warning that sensitive revenue, transaction, and cash-flow information may be transmitted to third-party platforms. In this context, the omission is risky because financial data is commercially sensitive, and Slack channels/workspaces may have broader visibility, retention, or app access than intended.
The skill's stated purpose is financial analysis, but the documentation extends it to Slack-based reporting and Airtable storage, which introduces secondary exfiltration and persistence channels for highly sensitive business data. Expanding capabilities beyond core analysis increases attack surface and the chance that revenue, cash-flow, and account details are sent to less-controlled third-party systems.
The Slack reporting example instructs sending recurring financial reports to a workspace/channel without advising users to validate recipients, channel privacy, app permissions, or data sensitivity. Because the reports include revenue totals, projections, runway, and top performers, an incorrect or overly broad destination could leak valuable internal financial intelligence.
The setup instructions tell users to export live API keys and service-account JSON directly in environment variables without any guidance on secure secret handling, scoping, rotation, or avoiding logs/history exposure. For payment processors and analytics accounts, compromised credentials could enable unauthorized access to financial records, reporting data, and connected services.
No suspicious patterns detected.