Track Content Attribution & Creator Credits Automatically

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 11:07 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill’s content-protection purpose is coherent, but it encourages automated legal enforcement and website changes without clear confirmation or safety boundaries.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only for content and sites you own or are authorized to manage, keep legal notices and DMCA filings in draft mode for human/legal review, disable or tightly bound automatic canonical edits, and provide least-privilege credentials through environment variables or a secrets manager rather than command-line arguments.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:213

Finding

WordPress API Credential Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 213–215
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext credential exposure through process arguments
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash

skill configure --enable-canonical-auto-inject \
  --wordpress-api-key="your-token" \
  --verify-with-gsc

Technical Analysis

The documented command instructs users to replace your-token with a WordPress API credential and pass it directly as a command-line argument. Command-line secrets can be exposed through shell history, process inspection utilities, command auditing, CI/CD logs, terminal capture, telemetry, and diagnostic output.

Although the repository contains only documentation and no executable implementation, following this configuration example with a real credential would create a concrete secret-disclosure risk. The available access would depend on the permissions assigned to the exposed WordPress token.

Attack Path

1. A user replaces your-token with a valid WordPress API token.
2. The user executes the documented command.
3. The complete command and token are retained in shell history, captured in logs, or temporarily exposed through the operating system's process metadata.
4. A local user, administrator, CI/CD log reader, monitoring service, or other party with access to those records obtains the token.
5. The party authenticates to the associated WordPress API using the exposed credential.
6. The party performs operations allowed by the token, potentially including unauthorized content or canonical-tag modification.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation exposes the privileges granted to the WordPress API token. Depending on its scope and associated account, an attacker could read protected site data, modify published content, alter canonical tags and SEO metadata, or perform other WordPress API operations. The impact is limited by the token's configured permissions but could affe ...[truncated 63 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Do not accept API credentials directly through command-line arguments.
• Retrieve the token from a protected environment variable, operating-system credential store, or dedicated secrets manager.
• Alternatively, request the token through an interactive prompt that disables terminal echo.
• Ensure application logs and diagnostic output redact credentials.
• Configure restrictive permissions for shell-history and CI/CD log files, and disable history recording for commands that may contain secrets.
• Issue a dedicated, least-privilege WordPress token limited to the operations required for canonical-tag management.
• Document credential rotation and immediate revocation procedures for potentially exposed tokens.
• Prefer a configuration pattern such as:

  bash

  export WORDPRESS_API_TOKEN="..."
  skill configure --enable-canonical-auto-inject \
    --wordpress-api-token-env="WORDPRESS_API_TOKEN" \
    --verify-with-gsc
  

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Ae1

High

• Category: analysis-evasion
• Confidence: 100% confidence

Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

md

_WEBHOOK_URL"],"bins":["curl","jq"]},"os":["macos","linux","win32"],"files":["SKILL.md"],"emoji":"⚖️"}}

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly advertises automatic canonical-tag injection and legal/enforcement actions, which are consequential external operations that can modify websites or trigger real-world legal communications. Without an explicit confirmation gate, dry-run default, scope validation, and warnings about side effects, a user or downstream agent could unintentionally alter production content, damage SEO, or send legal notices based on incomplete or incorrect classification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.