Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md "files": ["SKILL.md"],
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is not malicious code, but it asks agents to perform broad cloud asset moves, tagging, indexing, sharing, and notifications without enough guardrails or privacy scoping.
Install only if you are comfortable granting this workflow access to cloud storage, DAM systems, and notification channels. Before use, require a dry run, narrow the target folders or buckets, confirm every write or archive action, disable OCR/AI analysis for sensitive repositories unless explicitly needed, and review what metadata or previews may be sent to Slack or third-party providers.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
"files": ["SKILL.md"],
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
AWS_REGION="us-east-1"
# Google Cloud (if using Google Drive)
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS="/path/to/credentials.json"
# Secondary integrations (optional)
ADOBE_XDM_API_KEY="adobe-api-key"
The skill is designed for bulk organization, folder creation, archival, and automated movement of assets, but the description and quick-start prompts do not prominently warn that these actions can affect large volumes of user data. In an agent setting, that omission increases the risk of accidental destructive or hard-to-reverse operations.
The skill promotes integrations with Slack, DAMs, and cloud providers, but it does not clearly warn that asset metadata, filenames, previews, or notifications may be transmitted to third-party services. This can expose sensitive business information, especially in creative, legal, or pre-release asset workflows.
The safety section makes a categorical claim that the skill never alters file contents, yet earlier examples explicitly mention generating thumbnails, previews, and proof sets. Even if those are derivative outputs rather than edits to originals, the documentation is internally inconsistent and can mislead users about what operations the workflow performs on their data.
The document claims sensitive files containing PII, passwords, or encrypted content are skipped, but other sections advertise OCR, object detection, and content analysis over assets. That creates an unsafe ambiguity: the system may need to inspect content to decide whether it is sensitive, which means users could wrongly assume sensitive materials are never processed or transmitted.
No suspicious patterns detected.