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Security audit

nansen-mpp-payment

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is marked suspicious because its setup instructions pipe a downloaded Tempo installer directly into a shell without verification, creating a supply-chain and code-execution risk.

Consider avoiding installation until the CLI installer can be verified through a trusted signature or checksum, or installed separately from the skill. The scan was partial because a referenced local path was missing, so the evidence does not establish that all related behavior was inspected.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The command downloads a mutable remote script and immediately executes it without pinning or authenticity verification beyond HTTPS. A compromised installer source could run arbitrary commands under the user's account; using an apparently official installation URL reduces suspicion of malicious intent but does not remove the supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Install the tempo CLI
curl -fsSL https://tempo.xyz/install | bash
# 2. Log in (creates / unlocks the tempo wallet)
tempo wallet login
# 3. Fund it with USDC on the chain tempo selects for your environment

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The pipeline turns remotely supplied bytes directly into shell commands, creating a genuine code-execution risk rather than merely fetching documentation. This is the same underlying installer vulnerability reported by SC2 and SQP-2, not evidence of a separate malicious chaining attack.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Install the tempo CLI
curl -fsSL https://tempo.xyz/install | bash
# 2. Log in (creates / unlocks the tempo wallet)
tempo wallet login
# 3. Fund it with USDC on the chain tempo selects for your environment

The setup workflow executes a downloaded installer without warning about running remote code.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The setup instructions pipe a downloaded installer directly into Bash without verification or a review step. If the installer or its delivery infrastructure is compromised, it executes with the invoking user's privileges and could access local credentials or wallet material; the payment-wallet context increases the consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Smart Money netflow
tempo request -X POST https://api.nansen.ai/api/v1/smart-money/netflow \
  --json '{"chains":["solana"],"pagination":{"page":1,"page_size":10}}'

# TGM holders

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

--json '{"chains":["solana"],"pagination":{"page":1,"page_size":10}}'

TGM holders

tempo request -X POST https://api.nansen.ai/api/v1/tgm/holders
--json '{"token_address":"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v","chain":"solana"}'

text

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

Discovering paid endpoints

bash
curl https://api.nansen.ai/.well-known/x402

Returns paymentProtocols: ["x402", "mpp"] (when MPP is enabled server-side) and the list of paid resources.