Back to skill

Security audit

AIOZ Pin Toolkit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears intended for AIOZ Pin management, but its credential handling and destructive actions need careful review before use.

Install only if you trust the publisher and are comfortable giving the skill AIOZ Pin credentials. Before using it, update or wrap the scripts so credentials are read from environment variables, require explicit confirmation before deleting API keys or unpinning content, and avoid following redirects with custom credential headers.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/delete_api_key.sh:3
Finding

Authentication credentials are exposed through positional command-line arguments

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
&2 exit 1 fi ``` For pinning and billing scripts: ```bash : "${PINNING_API_KEY:?PINNING_API_KEY is required}" : "${PINNING_SECRET_KEY:?PINNING_SECRET_KEY is required}" ``` 3. Reserve positional parameters exclusively for non-secret values such as pin IDs, key names, file paths, offsets, and limits. 4. Update `README.md`, `SKILL.md`, and `references/api_reference.md` so all documented interfaces match the corrected implementations. 5. Ensure errors and debug logs never print credential values or complete authentication headers. 6. Add automated tests that fail if scripts assign authentication credentials from `$1`, `$2`, or other positional arguments. 7. Rotate any credentials that may previously have been passed literally or captured by process monitoring. 8. Apply least-privilege scopes and short expiration periods to JWTs and API keys to limit the impact of future disclosure. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/list_pins.sh:26
Finding

Custom authentication headers may be forwarded to cross-origin redirect destinations

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (45)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes a destructive DELETE action against API keys using a user-supplied key ID, with no described validation, authorization guard beyond possession of a JWT, or human confirmation step. In an agent workflow, prompt injection or simple misunderstanding could cause deletion of the wrong key and immediate loss of service or administrative access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

md
- `generate_api_key.sh` calls `POST /api/apikeys/create` with permission flags.
- Default permission values are `false` if not provided.
- `get_list_api_keys.sh` calls `GET /api/apikeys` and returns list of keys.
- `delete_api_key.sh` calls `DELETE /api/apikeys/{keyId}` and removes the key.

### 4. Pin Details & Management

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The unpin endpoint accepts a user-provided pin ID for a destructive action and is presented without robust safety controls. Because agents act on natural-language requests, this creates parameter-abuse risk where an attacker or accidental user request causes deletion of pinned content retention for the wrong asset.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

md
- Calls `GET /api/pinning/pins?offset=...&limit=...`
  - Defaults: `OFFSET=0`, `LIMIT=10`, `PINNED=true`, `SORT_BY=name`, `SORT_ORDER=ASC`
- **Unpin File:** `./scripts/unpin_file.sh PIN_ID`
  - Calls `DELETE /api/pinning/unpin/{pinId}`
  - Removes pin from AIOZ Pin service

### 5. Usage & Billing Data

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The documented DELETE endpoint accepts a user-supplied keyId for a destructive action, and the reference provides no guardrails such as confirmation, ownership verification guidance, or examples of safe validation. In an agent/tooling context, insufficient parameter constraints can lead to accidental or prompt-induced deletion of the wrong API key, causing service disruption or forced credential rotation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

Endpoint:

text
DELETE /api/apikeys/{keyId}

cURL example:

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The unpin endpoint performs a destructive action on a user-controlled pinId with no documented safety checks. In an agent setting, this creates parameter-abuse risk where a mistaken, manipulated, or unverified identifier could unpin the wrong content and reduce data availability.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 280)May include surrounding context.

Endpoint:

text
DELETE /api/pinning/unpin/{pinId}

cURL example:

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Much of the user-facing documentation is written in Vietnamese, including setup, authentication, usage, behavior notes, and troubleshooting, while the file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an alternative language option. This can violate a language/locale policy when users are implicitly required to use a specific language without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The README gives correct advice not to pass credentials on the command line, but then documents exactly that pattern. In practice, shell arguments may be exposed via process listings, audit logs, shell history, crash reports, or agent telemetry, so users following the examples could unintentionally leak API keys and JWTs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is the same unsafe contradiction repeated in the main usage section: the text warns against CLI secrets, then demonstrates passing JWT and API keys as command-line arguments. In an agent or shared-host context, this increases the chance that credentials are exposed to other users, monitoring tools, or logs because the examples normalize insecure handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill enables shell-based execution of scripts that perform networked and destructive operations, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That weakens policy enforcement and increases the chance an agent can invoke shell commands more broadly than intended when handling user input or credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to ask users for API credentials and export them into the shell session. Although it warns against CLI arguments, it still encourages collecting secrets into a shell context without an explicit, prominent privacy warning at the collection point about persistence, logging, and exposure through environment inspection or session capture.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes an API key deletion capability as a normal operation without requiring confirmation or emphasizing the destructive effect. In an agent setting, that increases the risk of accidental or manipulated deletion of authentication material, causing service disruption or loss of access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

}

text

cURL example:

```bash
curl --location --request POST 'https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/' \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents a DELETE operation for removing API keys, but it does not warn users that the action is destructive or potentially irreversible. For markdown files, SQP-2 applies when descriptions omit warnings about behaviors that could affect user data or system integrity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The file describes an unpin DELETE request but provides no warning that unpinning can stop content from being retained by the service, which may impact data availability or user expectations. Markdown skill documentation should disclose destructive or integrity-affecting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/generate_api_key.sh (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Request URL: $REQUEST_URL"

# Send request to generate API key
RESPONSE=$(curl -s --location --request POST "$REQUEST_URL" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data-raw "$REQUEST_BODY")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 263)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 272)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 280)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 300)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 129)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 151)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 213)May include surrounding context.

md
fi

# Send request to get list of API keys
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X GET "https://api.aiozpin.network/api/apiKeys/list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json")