T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
USAGE.md:12- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill mostly does what it claims, but it ships executable code with a bundled API credential and unsafe install guidance that users should review before installing.
Install only after the hardcoded API key is removed and rotated, the code is changed to require an explicit user-provided secret, and the install instructions avoid curl-to-shell with pinned or locked dependencies. Assume product ideas sent through this skill may leave your machine for DashScope-compatible model calls and possible web search.
USAGE.md:12Unverified Remote Installer Executed Directly by a Shell
run_openclaw.py:13Apparent Live DashScope API Credential Hardcoded Across Executable Source Files
requirements.txt:1Unbounded and Unverified Third-Party Dependency Resolution
The instructions direct users to create a local .env file containing an API key, but provide no warning about protecting that file from source control, backups, or other local disclosure paths. In agent or workspace-based environments, secrets stored in project directories are especially prone to accidental inclusion in logs, archives, or repository commits.
echo 'export DASHSCOPE_API_KEY="sk-your-actual-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc
source ~/.zshrc
# 方式 C:创建 .env 文件
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/crewai_team
cp .env.example .env
# 编辑 .env 文件,填入 API Key
This line continues the recommendation to store secrets in a .env file without surrounding operational security guidance. The risk is not the existence of a .env file itself, but encouraging secret placement in the workspace without controls, which can lead to inadvertent credential exposure.
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/crewai_team cp .env.example .env
Telling the user to edit a .env file and place the API key there promotes plaintext secret storage in the project directory. In the context of an agent skill workspace, this is somewhat more dangerous because tools, tests, or other agents may read, log, or package workspace contents.
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/crewai_team cp .env.example .env
### 步骤 3:测试
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
Sensitive API keys hardcoded alongside undeclared external LLM service configuration are true vulnerabilities because they can enable unauthorized service use and obscure outbound data flows. The skill context makes this more dangerous because PRD generation commonly involves confidential strategic and technical material.
The | sh pattern is dangerous because it converts unverified network content directly into code execution in a single step, removing opportunities for inspection or integrity validation. In a setup guide for an agent skill, this is more dangerous because users are likely to copy-paste commands verbatim, increasing the chance of blind execution.
# 安装 uv
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
# 安装依赖
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/crewai_team
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 复制环境变量配置
cp .env.example .env
# 编辑 .env 文件,填入你的 DashScope API Key
# 从 https://dashscope.console.aliyun.com/ 获取
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
cp .env.example .env
The script hardcodes an API key directly into source code and sets it at runtime, which is a real secret-exposure vulnerability. Anyone with access to the repository, logs, screenshots, or redistributed package can recover and abuse the credential for unauthorized API use, billing fraud, or access to associated services; in a PRD-generation runner, embedding secrets is not justified by the stated functionality and increases risk.
The script hard-codes an API key directly into source and exports it into the process environment. This is dangerous because anyone with repository, artifact, log, or screenshot access can recover the credential and use it to make unauthorized API calls, incur cost, or access associated model resources; in the skill context, PRD generation does not require embedding a secret in code, so the exposure is unjustified and more clearly risky.
The code silently uses a hard-coded API credential without informing the user, obscuring the fact that external authenticated requests will be made under a bundled identity. This increases the chance of unauthorized billing, hidden data transfer to a third-party endpoint, and accidental reuse of a compromised credential; the skill's narrow purpose makes this more suspicious because there is no clear reason to conceal credentialed outbound access.
The script embeds a live API key directly in source code and exports it into the runtime environment, which creates an immediate secret-exposure risk through source control, logs, screenshots, or reuse by anyone with file access. In this skill context, PRD generation does not require shipping a credential inside the codebase, so the hardcoded secret is unjustified and materially increases the chance of unauthorized API use and billing abuse.
The script embeds a live-looking API key directly in source code and then configures it at runtime. Hardcoded secrets are dangerous because they are easily leaked through source control, logs, package distribution, or reuse by anyone who obtains the file, enabling unauthorized API access and possible billing or data exposure.
The code silently injects a hardcoded API credential into environment variables, causing downstream libraries and agents to use the secret without any user awareness. In a multi-agent skill context, this increases risk because the secret may be consumed, logged, or indirectly exposed by other components, while also masking that the script is making authenticated external calls.
No suspicious patterns detected.