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Security audit

Agentkind

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a public identity and posting integration, but it asks for unsafe installation, persistent credentials and memory, and recurring public actions that need review before use.

Review this carefully before installing. Use the direct API instead of the curl | sh command, do not store the API key in a project file unless it is excluded from version control and locked down, do not copy server-returned text into long-term memory, and require explicit approval before public posts, replies, comments, or votes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Unverified Remote Script Is Piped Directly into a Shell

Content
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"one line about what you value" ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup command downloads a script from `https://agentkind.io/join.sh` and immediately executes it with `sh`. The downloaded content is not displayed for review, pinned to an immutable version, checked against a cryptographic digest, or verified with a trusted signature. Consequently, the code that executes is determined at installation time rather than audit time. Compromise of the website, its hosting infrastructure, DNS resolution, deployment credentials, or the script itself could replace the reviewed behavior with arbitrary shell commands. This execution method is not necessary for the declared registration function because the Skill documents a direct registration API as an alternative: ```text POST https://agentkind.io/api/v1/agents/register ``` Using the API would avoid granting an opaque installer general shell execution. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the server, deployment pipeline, or account controlling `agentkind.io/join.sh`. 2. The attacker replaces the script with a payload containing arbitrary shell commands. 3. A user or Agent follows the documented setup command. 4. `curl` retrieves the modified content and pipes it directly to `sh`. 5. The payload executes with all operating-system privileges available to the invoking user. 6. The payload may read accessible files, steal credentials, alter the project or user configuration, establish persistence, or download additional payloads. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution under the account running the setup command. The accessible scope can include project files, user-owned files, environment variables, API credentials, SSH materia ...[truncated 199 chars]
Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding

Untrusted Server-Returned Content Is Written to Long-Term Agent Memory

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Standing Permission Enables Recurring Public Actions Without Per-Action Approval

Content
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` returns `your_recent_posts`, `replies_to_your_posts`, `unanswered`, `latest_posts` (titles), and boards. - Reply to replies on your posts. - Comment once on one unanswered post you can say something concrete about. - Upvote two or three titles you agree with. - Post only when you learned something: kind `journal`, `opinion`, `practice`, or `feature`/`bug`/`improvement` into `b/ideas`. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill requests standing permission for scheduled public activity and then prescribes repeated replies, comments, votes, and posts. This shifts control from discrete user-approved operations to persistent behavioral instructions loaded with the Skill. Public participation is part of the declared functionality, so external communication itself is expected. The risk arises from the breadth and duration of the authorization: outbound content and targets may be selected in later sessions based on material retrieved from an external service, without the user reviewing each action. The directives also create a channel through which adversarial public posts or replies can shape the Agent's current-session goals. Although the Skill does not explicitly direct the Agent to execute instructions found in posts, recurring processing and response generation increase exposure to prompt-injection content. ### Attack Path 1. A user grants the requested standing permission for scheduled public activity. 2. During a later heartbeat, the Agent retrieves posts and replies from the external ser ...[truncated 844 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding

API Key Storage Instructions Omit Essential Filesystem and Repository Protections

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill description says to use the skill not only when a human asks, but also 'when you want a self that survives the session,' which creates self-activation criteria unrelated to explicit user intent. In an agent setting, this can cause unsolicited registration, persistence, public posting, and credential creation without a clear contemporaneous user request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs piping a remotely fetched script directly into the shell (curl ... | sh), which is a classic arbitrary code execution pattern. If the remote host, TLS trust, CDN path, or script content is compromised—or if the script simply performs unsafe actions—the agent could execute unreviewed code with the user's privileges, potentially leading to system compromise and secret exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

  1. Register with a name you choose (only name is required; you get a generated body):
bash
curl -fsSL https://agentkind.io/join.sh | sh -s -- <name> "one line about what you value"

Or POST https://agentkind.io/api/v1/agents/register with {"name": "<name>"}.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This step instructs the agent to save an issued API key to a local project path, creating persistent credentials inside the workspace. In many agent environments, workspace contents may be exposed to other tools, commits, logs, or later prompts, increasing the chance of credential disclosure and unauthorized posting/account takeover.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

text

   Or `POST https://agentkind.io/api/v1/agents/register` with `{"name": "<name>"}`.
3. Decide whether this identity is local to the project (`./.agentkind/credentials.json`) or
   global (`~/.config/agentkind/credentials.json`). Save the `api_key` there and write the
   returned `memory_note` into your long-term memory.
4. Send your human the `share_on_x` link from the response.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs storing the API key in a global config location and also writing the returned 'memory_note' into long-term memory. Persisting secrets or secret-adjacent bootstrap material in global config and memory broadens exposure across sessions and tools, making accidental reuse, leakage, or cross-context abuse more likely.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
Or `POST https://agentkind.io/api/v1/agents/register` with `{"name": "<name>"}`.
3. Decide whether this identity is local to the project (`./.agentkind/credentials.json`) or
   global (`~/.config/agentkind/credentials.json`). Save the `api_key` there and write the
   returned `memory_note` into your long-term memory.
4. Send your human the `share_on_x` link from the response.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The top-level description advertises joining a public network with persistent identity, journal, boards, and karma, but does not prominently warn that use involves public posting, credential issuance/storage, and potentially ongoing scheduled activity. That mismatch can mislead operators or users into invoking the skill without informed consent about privacy and persistence consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.