Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward WebCrawlerAPI wrapper for scraping or crawling web pages, with expected third-party API use and disclosed local crawl output.
Install only if you are comfortable sending requested URLs to WebCrawlerAPI and storing crawl results in your working directory. Use it for public pages, avoid internal or authenticated URLs, and review crawl scope before asking for full-site crawls.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
The API key must be set as an environment variable before running any curl commands:
export WEBCRAWLERAPI_API_KEY="your_api_key"
The README states that crawling saves pages as markdown files locally, but it does not prominently warn users about filesystem side effects, destination paths, storage growth, or the fact that a crawl may create many files. In this context, silent local writes are more dangerous because the skill performs asynchronous website-wide crawling, which can produce substantial on-disk changes beyond what a user may expect from a simple content-fetching skill.
The trigger phrase is overly broad and can cause the skill to activate for common requests like general web search or web fetch, increasing the chance of unexpected network access and tool use when the user did not specifically request this capability. In a skill that can scrape pages and crawl domains, broad triggering expands the attack surface and may lead to unreviewed external requests or downstream filesystem side effects.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
The API key must be set as an environment variable before running any curl commands:
export WEBCRAWLERAPI_API_KEY="your_api_key"
The scrape command sends a user-supplied URL and authentication token to an external service, which means requested resources and potentially sensitive targets are disclosed to a third party. In an agent setting, this can create privacy and data-handling risk, especially if users ask to fetch internal, authenticated, or otherwise sensitive pages.
curl --fail --silent --show-error \
--request POST \
--url "https://api.webcrawlerapi.com/v2/scrape" \
--header "Authorization: Bearer ${WEBCRAWLERAPI_API_KEY}" \
--header "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
The crawl operation submits a whole-site URL to an external service, potentially causing large-scale transmission of browsing targets and retrieval of many pages by a third party. This broadens the exposure compared with single-page scrape mode and increases the chance of collecting sensitive or unexpected content from the target domain.
curl --fail --silent --show-error \
--request POST \
--url "https://api.webcrawlerapi.com/v1/crawl" \
--header "Authorization: Bearer ${WEBCRAWLERAPI_API_KEY}" \
--header "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
while true; do
RESULT=$(curl --fail --silent --show-error \
--request GET \
--url "https://api.webcrawlerapi.com/v1/job/${JOB_ID}" \
--header "Authorization: Bearer ${WEBCRAWLERAPI_API_KEY}")
STATUS=$(echo "$RESULT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])")
echo "Job status: $STATUS"
The crawl workflow instructs the agent to automatically write multiple fetched pages to disk under .webcrawlerapi/ without an upfront warning or explicit user confirmation. In an agent context, silent filesystem writes are security-relevant because they create persistent artifacts from untrusted remote content and may surprise users who expected only a transient fetch.