Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a straightforward Todoist automation skill that can modify Todoist data and upload chosen files, with those capabilities mostly disclosed.
Install only if you want an agent to act on your Todoist account with your API token. Review destructive commands before use, especially delete operations, and only upload files or stdin content that you intend to store in Todoist.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/move`
- `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/close`
- `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/reopen`
- `DELETE /api/v1/tasks/{id}`
### Projects
- `GET /api/v1/projects`
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- `POST /api/v1/projects/{id}`
- `POST /api/v1/projects/{id}/archive`
- `POST /api/v1/projects/{id}/unarchive`
- `DELETE /api/v1/projects/{id}`
- `GET /api/v1/projects/search`
- project search: `projects search` now calls the dedicated Todoist project search endpoint; `--exact` still performs a local exact-name pass over the returned results for compatibility
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- `POST /api/v1/sections/{id}`
- `POST /api/v1/sections/{id}/archive`
- `POST /api/v1/sections/{id}/unarchive`
- `DELETE /api/v1/sections/{id}`
- section move: no REST endpoint exists; the CLI keeps `sections move` only as a compatibility stub that returns an error
### Labels
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- `GET /api/v1/labels/{id}`
- `POST /api/v1/labels`
- `POST /api/v1/labels/{id}`
- `DELETE /api/v1/labels/{id}`
- `GET /api/v1/labels/search`
- label search: `labels search` now calls the dedicated Todoist label search endpoint; `--exact` still performs a local exact-name pass over the returned results for compatibility
The skill advertises and documents capabilities that read environment variables, access local files, write/read attachment content, and make network requests to Todoist, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That omission weakens reviewability and least-privilege controls, making it easier for a caller or host to invoke a skill with broader-than-expected access to secrets and local data.
The skill prominently supports uploads, comments, add-file, and add-stdin workflows that transmit local file contents and arbitrary text to Todoist's servers, but the description and safety guidance do not explicitly warn that this data leaves the local environment. Users may unknowingly send sensitive notes, logs, transcripts, or files to a third-party service, increasing the risk of privacy breaches or secret disclosure.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
from urllib.parse import urlencode
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
API_BASE = "https://api.todoist.com/api/v1"
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 60
This code reads arbitrary local files and uploads their raw contents to a remote Todoist endpoint. Although uploads are part of the feature, there is no confirmation prompt or user-facing disclosure in this file near the upload path that the selected file's contents will be sent over the network.
No suspicious patterns detected.