T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/feishu-bitable.js:8- Finding
Arbitrary API Base URL Can Exfiltrate Feishu Credentials and Data in Bitable Script
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill mostly does what it says, but it handles powerful Feishu credentials and remote writes with under-disclosed and unsafe configuration surfaces.
Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill Feishu app credentials with document, board, and Bitable write access. Use a least-privilege Feishu app, avoid setting FEISHU_BASE_URL unless you fully trust and control the endpoint, do not run token-printing commands in logged environments, and test on non-sensitive documents first.
scripts/feishu-bitable.js:8Arbitrary API Base URL Can Exfiltrate Feishu Credentials and Data in Bitable Script
scripts/feishu-board.js:12Arbitrary API Base URL Can Exfiltrate Feishu Credentials and Data in Board Script
scripts/feishu-markdown-to-docx.js:13Arbitrary API Base URL Can Exfiltrate Feishu Credentials and Document Content in Markdown Converter
scripts/feishu-board.js:180Tenant Access Token Is Exposed Through Standard Output
scripts/feishu-markdown-to-docx.js:6Markdown Converter Uses an Undeclared and Unpinned Third-Party Dependency
The description claims deep structured Feishu features that are not present in the analyzed implementation, including Mermaid/PlantUML embedding, Bitable API manipulation, and complex lossless Markdown conversion. Such discrepancies make the skill harder to trust and audit, and can conceal the real operational surface from users deciding whether to supply credentials or permit document modifications.
The description claims deep structured Feishu features that are not present in the analyzed implementation, including Mermaid/PlantUML embedding, Bitable API manipulation, and complex lossless Markdown conversion. Such discrepancies make the skill harder to trust and audit, and can conceal the real operational surface from users deciding whether to supply credentials or permit document modifications.
The description claims deep structured Feishu features that are not present in the analyzed implementation, including Mermaid/PlantUML embedding, Bitable API manipulation, and complex lossless Markdown conversion. Such discrepancies make the skill harder to trust and audit, and can conceal the real operational surface from users deciding whether to supply credentials or permit document modifications.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 1. 🎨 画板图谱注入器 (`scripts/feishu-board.js`)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
### 3. 📜 高级排版转化引擎 (`scripts/feishu-markdown-to-docx.js`)
The skill advertises and appears to rely on environment variables and networked Feishu API access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries in the skill manifest. That creates an authorization transparency gap: operators and downstream agents cannot easily tell what capabilities the skill needs, increasing the chance of over-broad execution or accidental secret/data exposure.
The skill emphasizes broad write access to documents, boards, and tables without clearly warning that it can modify user data and structured content. In a skill whose purpose is direct mutation of collaborative assets, the absence of a modification warning increases the chance of unintended writes, destructive updates, or misuse with overly privileged accounts.
The skill instructs users to provide Feishu app credentials but does not include an explicit warning about sensitive secret handling, storage, rotation, or least-privilege configuration. That increases the risk of users pasting high-value credentials into insecure contexts or granting an app broader access than necessary.
The document is written as an agent-facing reference entirely in Chinese, including the title and operational guidance, without indicating that language choice is optional or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking or region-specific context. This can violate language/locale policy because it implicitly constrains skill operation to a specific language without user opt-in.
The header documentation says "Create spreadsheets with any size", but createBitable explicitly limits processing to Math.min(rowCount, 100) at L139. Additionally, writeBatch converts individual cell coordinates into append-record calls without using row indices, so the behavior is not faithful to arbitrary spreadsheet creation and is materially narrower than the claim.
The script prints the freshly obtained tenant access token directly to stdout in the get-tenant-token command. In CLI and agent environments, stdout is commonly captured by logs, orchestration frameworks, chat transcripts, or other tools, so this can leak a credential that enables authenticated Feishu API access.
The script reads an arbitrary local Markdown file and uploads its full contents to the Feishu document API with no explicit confirmation, dry-run mode, or visibility warning at the point of exfiltration. In an agent-skill context, this creates a real data-exposure risk because a caller may pass sensitive local files or be unaware that all content is being transmitted to a remote SaaS endpoint.
The natural-language comments present the description under a Chinese-only heading ("中文说明") with no corresponding language choice or alternate locale. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill assumes a specific language without user opt-in or justification.
The create-whiteboard, fill-diagram, and run commands perform write operations against Feishu APIs that modify documents and whiteboards. Although these actions are the script's purpose, the CLI provides no explicit user-facing warning that running these commands will alter remote content, which can matter for accidental invocation or use in automation.