T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
env-example.txt:2- Finding
Gitea Access Token and Meeting Data Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly matches its stated meeting-sync purpose, but it handles a powerful Gitea token and repository meeting data with insecure defaults and broad automated write/delete authority.
Review before installing. Use only an HTTPS Gitea endpoint, create a dedicated low-privilege bot token limited to the required repositories, avoid running setup against untrusted .env content, and consider replacing the installer with a pinned virtualenv-based setup. Operators should also understand that the cron workflow may automatically change meeting statuses, create pending records, append logs, and archive-delete old meeting files in Gitea.
env-example.txt:2Gitea Access Token and Meeting Data Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP
setup.sh:31Arbitrary Shell Command Execution through Sourced Environment Configuration
requirements.txt:1Unpinned Dependencies Installed into the System Python Environment
scripts/email_utils.py:38Unescaped Meeting Data Allows HTML Injection in Notification Emails
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.
The manifest limits this skill to synchronizing existing meeting status across Tencent Meeting and Gitea, explicitly stating it does not handle meeting creation. However, the documented and implemented create-pending command creates a new placeholder record in aifusion-meta, which is a meeting-creation-related capability outside the stated scope.
The manifest limits skill-h to synchronizing existing Tencent meeting status with Gitea repos and explicitly says it does not handle meeting creation. This script's documented purpose and implementation create a new placeholder record in the meta repository for previously unlinked meetings, which is a creation workflow rather than status sync, cancellation, reschedule, addition sync, or archival.
The code builds a fresh meta.yaml with meeting details and writes it to a new meetings directory in aifusion-meta. The manifest describes a background task for keeping existing meeting states consistent across Tencent Meeting and Gitea, plus archiving expired directories, but not creating new repository metadata entries for unknown meetings.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""
The skill declares shell, environment, and network-driven behavior but does not specify any explicit tool or permission boundaries in the manifest. In an agent platform, missing scope declarations can cause the runtime or operator to grant broader access than necessary, increasing the blast radius if the skill is misused or compromised.
The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and presents the skill behavior as fixed, with no indication that users can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific context. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The user-facing command descriptions and operational notes in the header comment are written entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported. This is a natural-language policy concern because it imposes a specific language without documented user choice or justification.
The top-level comment describes OpenClaw performing scan, Tencent meeting fetch, comparison, and then invoking the corresponding commands for cancellation/reschedule/archive-style sync outcomes. Yet the module also documents and dispatches a create-pending command, which is not part of that described sync flow and contradicts the stated operational intent of the module documentation.
This code includes natural-language instructions and user-facing messages entirely in Chinese, and later emits Chinese status/error strings, but provides no user opt-in or documented locale constraint. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user choice is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified as region-specific.