Back to skill

Security audit

skill-h-meeting-sync

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its stated meeting-sync purpose, but it handles a powerful Gitea token and repository meeting data with insecure defaults and broad automated write/delete authority.

Review before installing. Use only an HTTPS Gitea endpoint, create a dedicated low-privilege bot token limited to the required repositories, avoid running setup against untrusted .env content, and consider replacing the installer with a pinned virtualenv-based setup. Operators should also understand that the cron workflow may automatically change meeting statuses, create pending records, append logs, and archive-delete old meeting files in Gitea.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
env-example.txt:2
Finding

Gitea Access Token and Meeting Data Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
setup.sh:31
Finding

Arbitrary Shell Command Execution through Sourced Environment Configuration

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
requirements.txt:1
Finding

Unpinned Dependencies Installed into the System Python Environment

Content
View full analysis
=2.28.0 python-dotenv>=1.0.0 PyYAML>=6.0 pytz>=2023.3 python-dateutil>=2.8.2 ``` ### Technical Analysis Every dependency is specified with an open-ended lower bound. Consequently, installation can select any future release satisfying the constraint, along with unpinned transitive dependencies. There is no lock file, hash verification, or reviewed dependency snapshot. The use of `--break-system-packages` explicitly bypasses protections intended to prevent `pip` from modifying an externally managed Python installation. This can overwrite or conflict with packages used by unrelated system applications. Although the listed package names are legitimate and no typosquatted package was identified, the installation method creates avoidable supply-chain and system-integrity risk. ### Attack Path 1. A dependency account, release pipeline, package index, or transitive dependency is compromised, or a future incompatible version is published. 2. A user runs `setup.sh`. 3. `pip` resolves the newest versions satisfying the broad `>=` constraints. 4. The selected package is installed into the system Python environment without hash verification. 5. Malicious installation hooks or imported package code execute, or incompatible files disrupt other Python applications. ### Impact Assessment The selected package code runs with the privileges of the account invoking setup. Potential effects include: - Theft of the Gitea token and other readable credentials. - Modification of Skill behavior. - Arbitrary network communication or local code execution. - Corruption of unrelated ...[truncated 337 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/email_utils.py:38
Finding

Unescaped Meeting Data Allows HTML Injection in Notification Emails

Content
View full analysis
取消原因' f'{reason}' ) if reason else "" return f""" ``` ```html {topic} ... {meeting_code} ... {repo} ... {organizer} ``` Rescheduling URLs and metadata are also inserted without escaping or URL validation: ```html {topic} ... 🎥 加入新腾讯会议 ``` Pending-meeting content has the same issue: ```html {topic} ... {meeting_id} ...
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (52)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Writing logs and updating repository contents via authenticated API without declared permissions creates a transparency and least-privilege problem. If operators or the runtime treat the skill as lower risk than it is, the skill could be granted access that permits silent content modification or log poisoning in source-control-backed repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest limits this skill to synchronizing existing meeting status across Tencent Meeting and Gitea, explicitly stating it does not handle meeting creation. However, the documented and implemented create-pending command creates a new placeholder record in aifusion-meta, which is a meeting-creation-related capability outside the stated scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest limits skill-h to synchronizing existing Tencent meeting status with Gitea repos and explicitly says it does not handle meeting creation. This script's documented purpose and implementation create a new placeholder record in the meta repository for previously unlinked meetings, which is a creation workflow rather than status sync, cancellation, reschedule, addition sync, or archival.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The code builds a fresh meta.yaml with meeting details and writes it to a new meetings directory in aifusion-meta. The manifest describes a background task for keeping existing meeting states consistent across Tencent Meeting and Gitea, plus archiving expired directories, but not creating new repository metadata entries for unknown meetings.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/archive.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/archive.py (reported line 186)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/cancel.py (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create_pending.py (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/reschedule.py (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/scan.py (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/scan.py (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · setup.sh (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

sh
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-h-meeting-sync"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-H (meeting_sync)..."
echo ""

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill declares shell, environment, and network-driven behavior but does not specify any explicit tool or permission boundaries in the manifest. In an agent platform, missing scope declarations can cause the runtime or operator to grant broader access than necessary, increasing the blast radius if the skill is misused or compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and presents the skill behavior as fixed, with no indication that users can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific context. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The user-facing command descriptions and operational notes in the header comment are written entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported. This is a natural-language policy concern because it imposes a specific language without documented user choice or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The top-level comment describes OpenClaw performing scan, Tencent meeting fetch, comparison, and then invoking the corresponding commands for cancellation/reschedule/archive-style sync outcomes. Yet the module also documents and dispatches a create-pending command, which is not part of that described sync flow and contradicts the stated operational intent of the module documentation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This code includes natural-language instructions and user-facing messages entirely in Chinese, and later emits Chinese status/error strings, but provides no user opt-in or documented locale constraint. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user choice is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.