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Security audit

skill-d-create-issues

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a coherent meeting-to-Gitea workflow, but it ships insecure defaults that can expose tokens, accept forged webhook events, and run unsafe setup code.

Review this skill before installing. Use only an HTTPS Gitea endpoint, require a strong webhook secret, avoid exposing the listener publicly, do not run setup.sh against untrusted .env content, prefer a virtual environment with pinned dependencies, and confirm generated issues and emails before sending or publishing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (6)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
env-example.txt:2
Finding

Gitea Bot Token Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
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` over plaintext HTTP. 4. An attacker with network visibility captures the ...[truncated 574 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/webhook.py:34
Finding

Webhook Listener Accepts Unauthenticated Events by Default

Content
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bool: """验证 Gitea HMAC-SHA256 签名(WEBHOOK_SECRET 为空时跳过验证)。""" if not WEBHOOK_SECRET: return True if not signature_header: return False ``` ```python @app.route("/gitea-webhook", methods=["POST"]) def gitea_webhook(): payload_bytes = request.get_data() sig = request.headers.get("X-Gitea-Signature", "") if not verify_signature(payload_bytes, sig): abort(403) event = request.headers.get("X-Gitea-Event", "") if event != "push": return "ignored", 200 try: payload = json.loads(payload_bytes) except Exception: abort(400) triggers = extract_triggers(payload) for trigger in triggers: signal = { "ts": datetime.now(TZ).isoformat(), "event": "confirmed_issue_detected", "repo": trigger["repo"], "meeting_dir": trigger["meeting_dir"], } line = f"SKILL_D_TRIGGER: {json.dumps(signal, ensure_ascii=False)}" print(line, flush=True) ``` ```python app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=WEBHOOK_PORT, debug=False) ``` ### Technical Analysis The supplied configuration leaves `WEBHOOK_SECRET` empty. When it is empty, `verify_signature` unconditionally accepts requests. The Flask service also binds to `0.0.0.0`, making it reachable through every available network interface unless an external firewall blocks access. An unauthenticated client can therefore submit a for ...[truncated 1431 chars]
Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:86
Finding

Repository-Controlled Content Can Indirectly Hijack Agent Instructions

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
setup.sh:30
Finding

Setup Script Executes the Dotenv Configuration as Shell Code

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
setup.sh:11
Finding

Unpinned Dependencies Are Installed into the System Python Environment

Content
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=2.28.0 python-dotenv>=1.0.0 PyYAML>=6.0 pytz>=2023.3 python-dateutil>=2.8.2 flask>=3.0.0 ``` ### Technical Analysis Every dependency uses an open-ended lower-bound constraint. A future release satisfying the constraint can be installed without review, and no hashes authenticate the exact artifacts. The script also uses `--break-system-packages`, bypassing protections intended to prevent pip from modifying an externally managed Python installation. The reviewed package names are established packages, and no specific malicious dependency was identified. The risk arises from unconstrained future versions, lack of artifact integrity pinning, and modification of a shared interpreter environment. ### Attack Path 1. The operator runs `setup.sh` at a later date. 2. pip resolves the newest releases satisfying the open-ended constraints. 3. A compromised, malicious, or unexpectedly incompatible release is selected. 4. Installation modifies the system Python environment because `--break-system-packages` is enabled. 5. Installation-time behavior or later imports execute the affected package code. 6. The Skill or unrelated Python applications inherit the compromised or incompatible dependency. ### Impact Assessment A malicious dependency executes with the installing user's privileges and can access the local Gitea credential, repository data handled by the Skill, and other user files. Even without malicious code, dependency conflicts can break system utilities or unrelated applications using the same interpreter. The issue does not establish that any currently listed package is malici ...[truncated 8 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/email_utils.py:40
Finding

Unescaped Meeting Data Is Embedded in Generated Email HTML

Content
View full analysis
' f'' f'#{i["issue_number"]}' f'{i["task"]}' f'@{i["assignee"]}' f'' for i in created_issues ) ``` ```python if minutes_content_summary: summary_section = f"""

📝 会议纪要摘要

{minutes_content_summary}
""" ``` ```python quote_str = ( f'
{quote}
' ) if quote else "" ``` ```python content_preview = confirmed_issue_content[:3000] if len(confirmed_issue_content) > 3000: content_preview += "\n\n...(内容过长,已截断,请到 Gitea 查看完整版)" return f""" ...
{content_preview}
``` ### Technical Analysis Task text, quotes, meeting summaries, issue URLs, and confirmed issue content are interpolated directly into HTML without context-appropriate escaping or sanitization. An attacker who controls repository meeting content can inject arbitrary markup, including deceptive links, images that cause remote tracking requests, or malformed tags that alter the visible message. Most modern email clients restrict scripts, so arbitrary JavaScript exec ...[truncated 1075 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (45)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check.py (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create_issues.py (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create_issues.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/finish.py (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/finish.py (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/webhook.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · setup.sh (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

sh
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-d-create-issues"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"

echo "🚀 设置 Skill-D (create_issues)..."
echo ""

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs operators to expose an HTTP webhook listener on a public IP and start it as a background service, but provides no authentication, source validation, transport security, or warning about the risks of opening a network-accessible endpoint. In this context, an unauthenticated or weakly protected webhook can be abused to trigger workflows, spam the agent, or manipulate issue-creation behavior via forged push events.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

Running the webhook with nohup as a detached background process creates persistent network-facing behavior outside the user's immediate awareness and normal session lifecycle. In combination with the public webhook setup, this increases the chance that an exposed service remains running indefinitely without supervision, patching, access controls, or restart policy hardening.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

启动 Webhook 监听服务(后台常驻):

bash
nohup python3 scripts/webhook.py > ~/.config/skill-d-create-issues/webhook.log 2>&1 &

方式 B:OpenClaw 对话

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and describes the skill behavior in a way that implies a Chinese-language workflow ('正式纪要邮件' and task notifications) without offering any language or locale choice. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The natural-language comments and usage descriptions are presented in Chinese only, including command explanations and operational guidance. This imposes a specific language/locale on users without any visible opt-in, fallback, or justification that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The wrapper invokes external Python scripts while passing the full parent environment through unchanged via env: process.env. In an automation/agent context, environment variables commonly contain API tokens, credentials, and internal configuration, so any called script gains broad access to secrets beyond what is minimally required for issue creation and email workflow tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script collects repository members' and organizer email addresses via API calls and emits them in its JSON output, even though its stated purpose is only to validate meeting prerequisites and return issue/minutes content. This creates unnecessary exposure of personal contact data to any downstream consumer of the script output, increasing privacy and data-handling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The script emits attendees' and organizer email addresses in plain JSON without any warning, consent flow, or indication that personally identifiable information will be disclosed. In an agent/automation context, this makes silent bulk collection and propagation of user contact data more dangerous because outputs may be logged, stored, or forwarded automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The module docstring, usage text, argument descriptions, and runtime messages are all written in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users. Under the policy, locale or language constraints should be opt-in or clearly justified as region-specific; this file provides neither.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The module description and all generated email templates are written in Chinese, and the HTML explicitly sets lang="zh" in each template. This imposes a specific language/locale without any visible opt-in or fallback, which matches the natural-language locale policy violation criteria.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The script changes and commits meta.yaml back to the repository by setting status fields and calling update_file_in_repo, but there is no confirmation prompt and no explicit warning near the operation that it will write to remote repository state. Although the module docstring mentions writing created_issues, the safety-critical repository update itself is not clearly disclosed at the point of execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script performs a Gitea user email lookup for each assignee using a bot token, which expands the skill's effective scope from updating meeting metadata and generating email payloads into directory/identity data access. This is risky because it enables collection of users' email addresses without clear user consent or strict minimization, and the returned addresses are then used for outbound communications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This function transmits runtime log entries over the network and writes them into a remote repository using an authorization token, but there is no visible consent, notice, validation of destination, or restriction on what fields may be logged. If entries contain sensitive runtime data, secrets, prompts, or user content, this creates a real exfiltration and privacy risk, especially because all exceptions are silently suppressed and failed or unexpected logging behavior may go unnoticed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/webhook.py (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

python
检测到 confirmed_issue.md 新增时,打印触发信号供 OpenClaw 识别。

启动方式(后台常驻):
    nohup python3 scripts/webhook.py \
      > ~/.config/skill-d-create-issues/webhook.log 2>&1 &

Gitea 每个受管仓库 Settings → Webhooks → Add Webhook:

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · setup.sh (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

sh
检测到 confirmed_issue.md 新增时,打印触发信号供 OpenClaw 识别。

启动方式(后台常驻):
    nohup python3 scripts/webhook.py \
      > ~/.config/skill-d-create-issues/webhook.log 2>&1 &

Gitea 每个受管仓库 Settings → Webhooks → Add Webhook:

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script's user-facing prompts and setup instructions are entirely in Chinese, including installation status, configuration guidance, and webhook setup details. This imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or any documented locale justification, matching the policy's language/locale violation criterion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · setup.sh (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

sh
if [ ! -f "$ENV_FILE" ]; then
    cp "$SKILL_DIR/env-example.txt" "$ENV_FILE"
    chmod 600 "$ENV_FILE"
    echo ""
    echo "📝 已创建配置文件:$ENV_FILE"
    echo "请编辑该文件,至少填入:"

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This plain-text env example includes operational explanations in Chinese on L05, L08, and L11, which imposes a specific language for understanding important configuration details. There is no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users can choose an English-only alternative, so this is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.