T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
env-example.txt:2- Finding
Gitea access token transmitted over plaintext HTTP
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This meeting skill largely matches its stated purpose, but it needs review because it handles Gitea tokens and repository data with unsafe setup and transport practices.
Review before installing. Use only an HTTPS Gitea endpoint, rotate any token used with the provided HTTP default, scope the bot token to the minimum repositories and actions, avoid running setup as root, and treat generated invitation content as untrusted until HTML escaping and URL validation are added.
env-example.txt:2Gitea access token transmitted over plaintext HTTP
setup.sh:28Dotenv configuration file is executed as arbitrary shell code
scripts/email_utils.py:19Unescaped meeting data permits HTML injection into invitation emails
requirements.txt:1Unpinned dependencies are installed into the system Python environment
A skill described as a full meeting orchestration entry point but lacking the promised controls can cause the surrounding agent to make unsafe assumptions, such as believing Tencent meeting creation, member lookup, and email preparation were completed or validated when they were not. Security-sensitive workflows become fragile when documentation substitutes for actual enforcement and implementation.
A skill described as a full meeting orchestration entry point but lacking the promised controls can cause the surrounding agent to make unsafe assumptions, such as believing Tencent meeting creation, member lookup, and email preparation were completed or validated when they were not. Security-sensitive workflows become fragile when documentation substitutes for actual enforcement and implementation.
A skill described as a full meeting orchestration entry point but lacking the promised controls can cause the surrounding agent to make unsafe assumptions, such as believing Tencent meeting creation, member lookup, and email preparation were completed or validated when they were not. Security-sensitive workflows become fragile when documentation substitutes for actual enforcement and implementation.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-a-create-meeting"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-A (create_meeting)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-a-create-meeting"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-A (create_meeting)..."
echo ""
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
SKILL_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/skill-a-create-meeting"
ENV_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/.env"
echo "🚀 设置 Skill-A (create_meeting)..."
echo ""
The skill advertises shell/network/env-backed behavior but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed-tools or permissions. In an agent runtime, this can lead to over-privileged execution where the skill gains broader access than users or reviewers expect, increasing the blast radius for misuse of environment secrets, shell commands, or network operations.
The trigger criteria are extremely broad and map to ordinary conversational phrases like 'open a meeting' or 'arrange a meeting,' making over-triggering likely. In an agent system, broad activation can cause unintended repository writes, member/email lookups, and downstream meeting/email actions from ambiguous user requests that did not clearly consent to these side effects.
The examples encourage activation across many common phrasings without corresponding negative examples or constraints, which increases the chance that the agent will invoke the skill when the user intended only discussion, brainstorming, or a query. Because this skill coordinates downstream state changes and email preparation, accidental invocation can leak participant data or create unwanted artifacts.
The skill description does not clearly warn users that invoking it may create repository files, write logs, and process member email addresses for outbound invitations. This weakens informed consent and transparency around data handling, especially because the workflow touches collaboration metadata and potentially personal contact information.
The file comments specify the workflow responsibilities entirely in Chinese, indicating a language-specific operating assumption for the skill. Under the policy rule, forcing or presuming a specific language without offering user choice or documenting a justified locale constraint is a natural-language policy violation.
The script hard-codes the timezone to Asia/Shanghai and uses Chinese-only CLI descriptions and output messages throughout the file. This is a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill forces a specific language/locale experience without offering the user any choice or opt-in.
The script creates meta.yaml and agenda.md in the target repository, which is a file-writing operation affecting user/project data. Although the module docstring describes that it manages meeting files, there is no explicit user-facing warning or confirmation near execution that repository contents will be created or modified for the specified repo.
The generated email hard-codes lang="zh" and uses Chinese-only user-facing text such as the heading and status message. This imposes a specific language/locale in the skill output without any visible opt-in or documented region-specific justification, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.
gitea_request sends an authorization token in HTTP headers and is used for API calls involving repository contents and user email lookups, but the function has no docstring, comment, or user-facing logging that warns about remote transmission of sensitive data. This matches the missing-warning criterion for code files because network calls carrying credentials or user/system data should have some disclosure when not otherwise documented in the file.
The functions create_file_in_repo and update_file_in_repo perform remote file writes to a Gitea repository, which can change user or project data, but the code provides no confirmation prompt, logging, or warning comment/docstring describing this effect. For code files, safety-relevant write operations should have some visible disclosure unless clearly warned elsewhere; no such disclosure is present in this file.
This code performs outbound HTTP requests to fetch and update a remote log file, sending both log contents and an authorization token. While the module docstring mentions logging, it does not provide any user-facing warning, confirmation, or explicit disclosure about network transmission of runtime data and credential use.
The script's user-facing messages are presented in Chinese throughout, including setup prompts, configuration instructions, and completion notes. This imposes a specific language on all users without offering a language choice or documenting that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking or region-specific audience.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
if [ ! -f "$ENV_FILE" ]; then
cp "$SKILL_DIR/env-example.txt" "$ENV_FILE"
chmod 600 "$ENV_FILE"
echo ""
echo "📝 已创建配置文件:$ENV_FILE"
echo "请编辑该文件,至少填入:"
The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and labels the skill as a meeting-automation flow without indicating that language selection is optional or configurable. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.
The file includes a Chinese-language comment while the rest of the file is in English, creating an implicit language constraint without offering user choice or explaining a region-specific need. This matches the policy category for language or locale restrictions expressed in natural language.
The dependency list uses a lower-bound specifier for requests instead of pinning to an exact version, which makes builds non-reproducible and can silently pull in vulnerable or behavior-changing releases. In a meeting-orchestration skill that likely performs network calls, dependency drift in an HTTP client library increases supply-chain and patch-management risk.
requests>=2.28.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.0
PyYAML>=6.0
pytz>=2023.3
requests has multiple known advisories, and because the manifest does not pin a version there is no way to verify whether deployment will use a patched release. Given this skill's role coordinating meeting creation and likely making outbound API calls, a vulnerable HTTP client could affect credential handling, request verification, or data exposure.
python-dotenv is specified with a minimum version only, so installations may resolve to different releases across environments. This weakens reproducibility and can expose the skill to vulnerable or incompatible versions, especially where environment loading affects credentials and service configuration.
requests>=2.28.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.0
PyYAML>=6.0
pytz>=2023.3
python-dateutil>=2.8.2
python-dotenv has known advisories and the unpinned requirement prevents verification that a safe version will be installed. Since dotenv libraries can influence secrets and runtime configuration, uncertainty here can contribute to misconfiguration or local file-handling risk.