Back to skill

Security audit

laomeng-zhc

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marked this skill suspicious because scanners reported that its inspection mode may run WebAssembly, build steps have temporary-file risks, and some content was not fully inspected; the evidence does not establish malicious intent.

Consider the suspicious verdict and Skillspector's do-not-install recommendation before installing. Review the inspection and build concerns, clarify what tools the skill may use, and seek a complete analysis of the partially inspected runner and image; current scan coverage is partial, so the results do not establish that the skill is safe.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (12)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
reset` / `zhc_out_cap`);该目标下文件 I/O 内置改报 **E314** 并提示改用 x86-64 或 wasm32-wasi;新增 `scripts/run_noos.js` 作为该目标的宿主运行器(`node run_noos.js 目标.wasm`),随包分发。契约侧登记错误码 E314,

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

md
| `assets/logo-language-256.png` | 字标(语言版) |

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The skill requires all user-facing responses to be in Chinese without offering a language choice.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Line L181 instructs the agent to respond entirely in Chinese (「对外答复全程中文」), without user opt-in or an exception for the user's preferred language. ZHC's Chinese syntax justifies preserving code and original diagnostics, but does not justify forcing all surrounding explanations into Chinese.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The documented inspection-only --info mode executes WebAssembly code.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supposedly non-executing --info mode instantiates the WebAssembly module, which can execute a start function, and then calls zhc_out_cap if it is a function. A malicious module can therefore run during inspection and hang the process or exhaust resources; the empty import object limits host access but does not prevent denial of service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The comment at L2516 claims the bridge has no backend, is always unavailable, and always returns failure, but the implementation starts a Python backend subprocess and forwards calls to it.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

L2516 explicitly describes an inert bridge, whereas L2556–L2647 implement backend startup using CreateProcessW at L2619, and L2701–L2735 start and communicate with that backend on demand. This contradicts the documented side-effect boundary: generated native programs can launch a subprocess and perform document-export operations rather than merely return a failure response.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The batch file is executed from a reusable temporary directory whose name is derived deterministically from the output path, with fixed names for build.bat, prog.c, and prog.exe. Concurrent builds targeting the same output can interfere, and an attacker able to modify that directory can replace the batch file or build inputs before execution, potentially running code with the agent's privileges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/zhc.py (reported line 4045)May include surrounding context.

python
f.write(")\r\n")

    try:
        r = subprocess.run([bat], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="mbcs",
                           errors="replace", timeout=ZHC_构建限时)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        return False, ("[构建失败] cl 超过 %d 秒未结束,已中止(宿主工具链或超大中间码),"

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The clang invocation itself uses an argument list and does not demonstrate shell injection, but its output is a predictable, reusable .zhc_tmp file. The function ignores the compiler's return code and accepts any nonempty file at that location, so a failed compilation that leaves a preexisting file untouched, or a concurrent build, can cause an unrelated artifact to be published as successful and potentially executed with --run.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/zhc.py (reported line 4144)May include surrounding context.

python
"-Wno-unknown-pragmas", "-fno-strict-aliasing",
           "-o", 产出, os.path.abspath(c_path)]
    try:
        r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",
                           errors="replace", timeout=ZHC_构建限时)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        return False, ("[构建失败] wasi-sdk clang 超过 %d 秒未结束,已中止(宿主工具链问题,"

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/zhc.py (reported line 4230)May include surrounding context.

python
"-Wl,--export=zhc_out_cap",
               "-o", "prog.wasm", "prog.c", "zhc_noos_impl.c"]
        try:
            r = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=work, capture_output=True, text=True,
                               encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=ZHC_构建限时)
        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
            return False, ("[构建失败] noos 构建超过 %d 秒未结束,已中止(宿主工具链问题,"

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/zhc.py (reported line 4276)May include surrounding context.

python
"""按进程树强制结束。超时程序可能是 cmd/cl 的子孙进程,只 kill 直接子进程会留孤儿。"""
    if os.name == "nt":
        try:
            subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/F", "/T", "/PID", str(pid)],
                           capture_output=True, timeout=15)
        except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError):
            # 强杀失败也不阻断上层:上层随后 p.wait(5) 会再确认一次

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/zhc.py (reported line 4296)May include surrounding context.

python
并在超时后 taskkill /T 连同子孙一并结束。
    """
    旗 = getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP", 0)
    p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, creationflags=旗)
    try:
        p.wait(timeout=限时)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:

Ae4

Medium
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.