Security audit

cliptude

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s uploads, account access, and paid processing fit its clearly stated purpose of creating Cliptude videos.

Use recordings you are comfortable sharing with Cliptude, protect your API key, and set a credit and revision limit before generation. The external CLI, MCP service, and companion skills require separate trust.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (1)

The media-upload workflow lacks a privacy warning about sending user recordings to Cliptude.

Medium

Category: Output Handling
Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The workflow instructs the agent to supply user voiceover recordings and presenter videos for Cliptude transcription and generation. Although it describes transcription, it does not explicitly warn users that their recordings will be transmitted to and processed by a third-party service, which matters when recordings contain sensitive speech or identifiable people.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.