T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:27- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 27–31
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party installer and Skill source
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ### Claude Code / skills.sh ```bash npx skills add Upload-Post/upload-post-comment-funneltext ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command invokes `npx` without pinning the `skills` package to a reviewed version. It also identifies the Skill repository by a mutable repository reference rather than an immutable release or commit hash. No checksum, package signature, or other integrity-verification procedure is specified. As a result, the content executed or installed when a user follows this command can differ from the content reviewed during this audit. A compromise of the package registry account, installer package, source repository, or associated publishing credentials could introduce malicious installer behavior or modified Skill instructions. This finding concerns the documented installation path. The audited project itself contains only Markdown files, and no embedded malicious script was identified. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the unpinned `skills` package, its publishing account, the referenced Skill repository, or another relevant distribution component. 2. The attacker publishes a modified package or Skill revision containing malicious code or instructions. 3. A user follows the documented `npx skills add Upload-Post/upload-post-comment-funnel` command. 4. `npx` obtains and executes the currently resolved installer package, which retrieves the mutable Skill source. 5. The compromised component executes with the invoking user's permissions or installs malicious Skill content into the agent environment. 6. The installed content can subsequently influence agent operations or access resources available to the installation process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could run arbitrary installer code with the ...[truncated 429 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the
skillsinstaller to a specific reviewed version rather than relying on the latest registry resolution:bash npx --yes skills@<reviewed-version> add Upload-Post/upload-post-comment-funnel@<immutable-reference> - Pin the Skill source to an immutable release tag backed by a protected commit, or preferably to a full commit hash if the installer supports it.
- Publish SHA-256 checksums or signed release manifests for distributed artifacts and require verification before installation.
- Use package provenance and cryptographic signing supported by the package registry and release platform.
- Recommend downloading and reviewing the installer and Skill contents before execution in sensitive environments.
- Run installation with least privilege in a sandbox or isolated environment, without unrelated secrets in environment variables.
- Document the exact installer version, Skill revision, expected checksums, and verification commands so users can reproduce the audited installation.
- Pin the
