T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
references/handling.md:19- Finding
Plain-Text Interaction Spoofing Can Trigger Unauthorized Actions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
references/handling.md, lines 19–29
Vulnerability Type: Authorization based on spoofable inbound text
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code Snippet
text When a user clicks a button, you simply receive a message like: Clicked "Approve". Respond based on the button label: - If the message says `Clicked "Approve"` → execute the approved action - If the message says `Clicked "Reject"` → cancel the action - If the message says `Selected engineer from "Choose an agent..."` → assign to engineer No parsing of `custom_id` needed. OpenClaw handles all the plumbing.The unsafe execution pattern is reinforced in
references/handling.md, lines 122–129:text 1. **Send** component message with action buttons 2. **Receive** click as inbound message (`Clicked "Yes".`) 3. **Execute** the requested action 4. **Edit** the original message to show the resultIt is also described in
SKILL.md, lines 112–119:text When a user clicks a button or selects an option, OpenClaw delivers it as a normal inbound message: - Button click → `Clicked "Yes".` - Select → `Selected option_a from "Pick an option".` No special callback handling needed — just read the incoming message text.Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs an agent to authorize and execute actions by matching ordinary inbound message text against human-readable component labels. The documented logic does not require verification of trusted interaction metadata, such as:
- Whether the input originated from an authentic Discord component event
- The original message and component identifiers
- The identity and authorization of the interacting user
- The channel or workflow to which the interaction belongs
- A server-generated opaque action identifier or nonce
- The current workflow state and interaction expiration time
Button labels and generated text such as
Clicked "Approve".are predictable and can also be supplied as ordinary user- ...[truncated 1771 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Do not authorize actions from message text alone. Treat strings such as
Clicked "Approve".as untrusted user input, not proof of a component interaction. -
Require trusted interaction metadata. Before executing an action, verify:
- The platform event is an authentic component interaction
- The original message ID and component ID match an outstanding workflow
- The initiating Discord user is authorized
- The interaction occurred in the expected channel or thread
- The action has not expired or already been consumed
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Use opaque action identifiers. Bind each component to a server-generated, unpredictable identifier rather than using its display label as the authorization key. Store the identifier with the expected user, action, resource, message, and expiry.
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Enforce authorization at execution time.
allowedUsersmay remain a user-interface restriction, but the action handler must independently verify the sender before performing privileged operations. -
Maintain workflow state. Record pending interactions and atomically mark single-use actions as consumed to prevent replay, delayed execution, and cross-workflow confusion.
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Fail closed. If trusted metadata is absent, ambiguous, expired, or inconsistent, do not execute the action. Ask the authorized user to initiate a fresh confirmation.
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Update the documentation. Replace the label-only examples with secure examples that explicitly distinguish genuine component events from ordinary messages and demonstrate identity, context, state, and expiry validation.
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