T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Mandatory Global Routing Hijacks Agent Goals and Automatically Expands Tasks
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is an automatic router that can execute and chain other skills broadly, with insufficient scoping and approval boundaries for the authority it describes.
Review this carefully before installing. It is not proven malicious, but it should only be used in an environment where you trust every downstream skill it can route to, can approve or block every side effect, and are comfortable with event/log persistence. Avoid granting it access to credentials, repositories, social accounts, email, or system-recovery tools unless the router is constrained by an external policy layer.
SKILL.md:3Mandatory Global Routing Hijacks Agent Goals and Automatically Expands Tasks
SKILL.md:14Arbitrary Local Scripts Are Executed After Metadata-Only Inspection
SKILL.md:91Broad Triggers Automatically Initiate State-Changing and External Workflows
The instruction to use this router on every request gives a powerful orchestration skill universal reach over all user inputs. In context, this is more dangerous because the same file also defines auto-selection, chaining, and direct execution behavior, so broad triggering magnifies the chance of unintended tool invocation and privilege expansion.
The 'review idea and execute' / 'brainstorm and do it now' trigger is especially risky because it combines broad natural-language matching with implied immediate execution. In a federated skill-composition system, this can escalate a casual brainstorming request into autonomous action selection and downstream execution without sufficiently bounded scope or approval.
The skill explicitly documents resolving a matched skill's run field and invoking the referenced shell or JS script with direct execution. In a router that is intended to run first and potentially dispatch across many skills, this creates a broad code-execution surface where any matched skill metadata can lead to execution of local scripts without a strong trust boundary, validation, or sandboxing.
The auto-execute hook allows subsequent skills to be triggered autonomously after one skill completes, without a mandatory user confirmation boundary. In this router's context, that behavior compounds risk because chained skills may include external communication, code execution, deployment, or recovery actions, turning a single match into a multi-step autonomous workflow.
Several trigger phrases are generic everyday terms such as "trends," "release," or broad content-creation wording, which can easily match benign conversation. In a router that can chain multiple downstream skills, ambiguous triggers increase accidental activation and can route normal dialogue into analysis, messaging, posting, or deployment workflows.
The document claims external actions always require approval, but earlier rules permit automatic notification and even auto-recovery behavior. This inconsistency is dangerous because operators may rely on a safety guarantee that the router does not actually enforce, leading to unreviewed outbound actions or state-changing operations.
The trigger phrases for the content pipeline are broad consumer-language phrases that could easily appear in ordinary conversation, causing unintended activation of a multi-step workflow that creates content and may progress toward publishing. In the context of a first-gateway auto-router, this increases the chance of accidental skill chaining and execution beyond the user's intended scope.
Phrases like 'do market research' are ambiguous and may match benign requests, yet this chain initiates competitor crawling, report generation, and email sending. Because the router is intended for use on every request, an overbroad trigger can cause unintended data collection and outbound actions with limited user awareness.
Generic triggers such as 'market research' and 'industry trends' are likely to overlap with ordinary discussion and can activate a broad data-collection workflow across multiple external sources. In this skill-router context, accidental invocation is more dangerous because it may launch parallel monitoring and scraping tasks automatically.
Trigger phrases like 'release', 'deploy', and 'push to production' are highly generic for a chain that includes commit and push operations. Even with stated safeguards, accidental routing into a deployment-related workflow is dangerous in a gateway skill because it can initiate sensitive code-management actions based on ambiguous user wording.
The chain explicitly persists inter-skill data as JSON files in an events directory without any user-facing disclosure, retention policy, or sensitivity controls. In a router that processes broad user requests, this can silently store prompts, outputs, identifiers, or other sensitive operational data, increasing privacy and leakage risk across chained skills.
The file uses English-only operational triggers and descriptions, while the signature includes Korean text, suggesting a mixed-locale environment. There is no statement offering users a language choice or clarifying that English-only triggers are required by design.
The phrase "start today" is common conversational language and could unintentionally match ordinary discussion rather than a system-status reporting chain. While a cron schedule is also listed, the natural-language trigger remains underspecified.
No suspicious patterns detected.