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Security audit

Mupeng Evolve — God-Tier Agent Evolution Engine

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is documentation-only, but it asks agents to repeatedly modify memory, tools, skills, heartbeat routines, and identity settings with insufficient approval boundaries.

Install only if you intentionally want an autonomous meta-skill and can constrain it. Keep tool, skill, heartbeat, SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, and permanent memory changes approval-only; review diffs before writes; avoid running it on untrusted messages; and document how to disable hooks and roll back memory or identity changes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
SKILL.md:64
Finding

Autonomous Modification of Tools and Installed Skills

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:108
Finding

Automatic Promotion of Untrusted Session Content into Persistent Memory

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:201
Finding

Automatic Modification of the Agent's Core Identity and Autonomy Policy

Content
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Remediation
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T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:231
Finding

Cross-Session Persistence Through Heartbeat and Session-Start Hooks

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The metadata explicitly positions the package as an agent evolution and self-improvement skill for autonomous behavior. In context, this is a real security concern because the skill's stated purpose includes self-modification capabilities, which can alter trusted agent state and project files if enabled without robust isolation, approval, and rollback controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

md
description: "The God-Tier Agent Evolution Engine. 6 top skills analyzed, dissected, and rebuilt from scratch. Zero external dependencies. Battle-tested in production. Makes your agent truly autonomous."
author: mupengi-bot
tags: [evolution, memory, earning, autonomy, identity, meta, self-improvement, autonomous-agent, production-ready]
keywords: [agent-evolution, self-evolve, memory-system, revenue-automation, autonomous-ai, zero-dependency, battle-tested, production, openclaw, meta-skill]
---

# 🐧 Mupeng Evolve — The God-Tier Agent Evolution Engine

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This section discusses another self-evolution skill, but within a document whose core feature set includes self-modification. The context makes the risk real: even though the match is on a comparison table entry, the surrounding content endorses autonomous modification of files such as memory, tools, heartbeat, and potentially identity/configuration documents.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
| Skill | Rating | Fatal Flaw |
|-------|--------|------------|
| **self-evolve** | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ | 🔴 Zero security. Agent can nuke its own SOUL.md. No guardrails. |
| **capability-evolver** | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ | 🟡 Over-engineered. Requires separate Node.js runtime + env vars. |
| **elite-longterm-memory** | ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ | 🔴 Requires LanceDB + OpenAI API key. $50+/month just for memory. |
| **agent-earner** | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ | 🔴 US-only platforms. USDC/crypto dependency. Unusable outside US. |

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

🧬 Engine 1: Safe Self-Evolution

Other skills let your agent modify anything without guardrails. That's not evolution — that's a ticking time bomb.

text
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The comparison to 'self-evolve' is not itself dangerous wording, but it appears immediately after a section promoting a file-mutating evolution loop. Because the skill claims to auto-apply changes in certain directories and log mutations, the broader context confirms a genuine self-modification risk that could affect integrity, persistence, and operator control.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

}

text

**vs self-evolve:** They give you a loaded gun with no safety. We give you a precision rifle with a scope.

---

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The competitive summary explicitly advertises self-modification as a supported feature of this skill. In an agent skill, self-modification materially increases attack surface because prompt injection, malformed inputs, or flawed heuristics can be turned into persistent changes to behavior, memory, or control files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 264)May include surrounding context.

md
## 🔬 Competitive Analysis Summary

| Feature | self-evolve | capability-evolver | elite-memory | agent-earner | doppelganger | aura | **mupeng-evolve** |
|---------|:-----------:|:-----------------:|:------------:|:------------:|:------------:|:----:|:-----------------:|
| Self-modification | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Security gate | ❌ | ⚠️ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill describes automatic mutation logging and memory behavior but does not present a clear upfront warning that it may automatically modify project files and persist user/project data in logs. That omission undermines informed consent and can lead operators to enable autonomous behavior without understanding the privacy, integrity, and audit implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The installation guidance tells users to add the skill to heartbeat or session-start routines, which are privileged, repeatedly invoked execution points, but it does not define strict activation boundaries, approval requirements, or safe defaults. In the context of a skill that performs self-evolution, memory promotion, communication checks, and logging, broad activation increases the chance of unintended autonomous file modification and persistent data collection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.