T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
references/examples.md:936- Finding
Missing Authentication and Authorization on Financial Operations and Reporting Endpoints
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is not malware, but its financial code examples are presented as secure/compliant while containing serious unsafe patterns.
Review before installing. Use this skill only for conceptual fintech discussion, not as a source of production-ready payment or DeFi code. Any generated implementation should add real authentication and authorization, tenant boundaries, redacted logging, test-only payment credentials during development, SafeERC20-style token handling, complete collateral/health-factor logic, and independent security review before handling real funds or regulated data.
references/examples.md:936Missing Authentication and Authorization on Financial Operations and Reporting Endpoints
references/examples.md:1435Collateral Withdrawal Solvency Check Always Returns True
references/examples.md:1157Unsafe ERC-20 Transfers Can Create Unbacked Accounting Balances
references/examples.md:396Caller-Controlled Payment Metadata Is Written to Audit Logs Without Redaction
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> 📎 **Code example 1** (typescript) — see [references/examples.md](references/examples.md)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> 📎 **Code example 1** (typescript) — see [references/examples.md](references/examples.md)
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> 📎 **Code example 1** (typescript) — see [references/examples.md](references/examples.md)
This is a markdown file, so SQP-2 applies to omissions in the skill description itself. The file presents example code that accesses credentials, processes payment details, writes audit logs, stores transaction data, and sends data to external services such as Stripe, but the surrounding markdown includes no warning about privacy, financial impact, or system/data handling implications.
The manifest describes a specialist for payment systems, regulatory compliance, security/fraud prevention, and financial technologies, but this file's second example is a full decentralized finance protocol with collateralized deposits, borrowing, liquidation, and oracle administration. That is a materially different operational domain from the payment-processing and compliance focus presented in the manifest.
The contract advertises emergency pause capability but does not inherit from or implement pausable behavior, so _pause() and _unpause() are non-functional/undefined. In a live DeFi protocol, this creates a dangerous false sense of recoverability during exploits or market emergencies, delaying response while users and operators assume they can halt the system.
Labeling ordinary append-mode file logging as 'immutable records' can cause operators and downstream users to rely on audit evidence that is in fact mutable. In a fintech/payment context, that can undermine incident response, fraud investigations, compliance attestations, and non-repudiation because local files and console output can be altered or deleted by an attacker or privileged insider.