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Security audit

fintech-specialist

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not malware, but its financial code examples are presented as secure/compliant while containing serious unsafe patterns.

Review before installing. Use this skill only for conceptual fintech discussion, not as a source of production-ready payment or DeFi code. Any generated implementation should add real authentication and authorization, tenant boundaries, redacted logging, test-only payment credentials during development, SafeERC20-style token handling, complete collateral/health-factor logic, and independent security review before handling real funds or regulated data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
references/examples.md:936
Finding

Missing Authentication and Authorization on Financial Operations and Reporting Endpoints

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/examples.md:1435
Finding

Collateral Withdrawal Solvency Check Always Returns True

Content
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= amount, "Insufficient balance"); // Check if withdrawal maintains health factor require( _checkHealthFactor(msg.sender, asset, amount, true), "Unhealthy position" ); // Update balances deposits[msg.sender][asset] = deposits[msg.sender][asset].sub(amount); totalDeposits[asset] = totalDeposits[asset].sub(amount); // Transfer tokens to user IERC20(asset).transfer(msg.sender, amount); emit Withdraw(msg.sender, asset, amount); } ``` ```solidity function _checkHealthFactor( address user, address asset, uint256 amount, bool isWithdrawal ) internal view returns (bool) { // Simulate the action and check resulting health // Implementation details... return true; } ``` ### Technical Analysis The withdrawal function relies on `_checkHealthFactor` as its only protection against removing collateral that backs an outstanding loan. That function unconditionally returns `true`, so the intended solvency requirement is never enforced. A user can therefore borrow assets and subsequently withdraw collateral even when the resulting position would be undercollateralized. The existing `_isHealthy` function does not mitigate the issue because `withdraw` does not call it after applying or simulating the balance change. This is a direct violation of a lending protocol's core collateralization invariant. Marking the function as a placeholder does not make it safe as a deployable example, particularly because the surrounding code is presented as an advanced DeFi implementation. ### Attack Path 1. The attacker deposits a supported co ...[truncated 931 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/examples.md:1157
Finding

Unsafe ERC-20 Transfers Can Create Unbacked Accounting Balances

Content
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0, "Amount must be greater than 0"); // Transfer tokens from user IERC20(asset).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount); // Update user balance deposits[msg.sender][asset] = deposits[msg.sender][asset].add(amount); totalDeposits[asset] = totalDeposits[asset].add(amount); // Mint interest-bearing tokens (simplified) _updateExchangeRate(asset); emit Deposit(msg.sender, asset, amount); } ``` The same unchecked pattern appears in withdrawal, borrowing, repayment, and liquidation: ```solidity IERC20(asset).transfer(msg.sender, amount); IERC20(asset).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), repayAmount); IERC20(borrowAsset).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), liquidationAmount); IERC20(collateralAsset).transfer(msg.sender, collateralToSeize); ``` ### Technical Analysis The contract calls `transfer` and `transferFrom` directly and ignores their Boolean return values. Some ERC-20 tokens return `false` instead of reverting on failure, while some non-standard implementations return no value. Fee-on-transfer and rebasing tokens can also cause the actual balance change to differ from the requested amount. During deposit, the contract credits the full requested amount immediately after the call. If the token returns `false` or transfers less than requested, the internal deposit balance can exceed the tokens actually received. The inflated deposit can then contribute to borrowing power. The owner-controlled `addAsset` function can register arbitrary token addresses, so token compatibility m ...[truncated 1278 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/examples.md:396
Finding

Caller-Controlled Payment Metadata Is Written to Audit Logs Without Redaction

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

md
> 📎 **Code example 1** (typescript) — see [references/examples.md](references/examples.md)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md
> 📎 **Code example 1** (typescript) — see [references/examples.md](references/examples.md)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

md
> 📎 **Code example 1** (typescript) — see [references/examples.md](references/examples.md)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This is a markdown file, so SQP-2 applies to omissions in the skill description itself. The file presents example code that accesses credentials, processes payment details, writes audit logs, stores transaction data, and sends data to external services such as Stripe, but the surrounding markdown includes no warning about privacy, financial impact, or system/data handling implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a specialist for payment systems, regulatory compliance, security/fraud prevention, and financial technologies, but this file's second example is a full decentralized finance protocol with collateralized deposits, borrowing, liquidation, and oracle administration. That is a materially different operational domain from the payment-processing and compliance focus presented in the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The contract advertises emergency pause capability but does not inherit from or implement pausable behavior, so _pause() and _unpause() are non-functional/undefined. In a live DeFi protocol, this creates a dangerous false sense of recoverability during exploits or market emergencies, delaying response while users and operators assume they can halt the system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Labeling ordinary append-mode file logging as 'immutable records' can cause operators and downstream users to rely on audit evidence that is in fact mutable. In a fintech/payment context, that can undermine incident response, fraud investigations, compliance attestations, and non-repudiation because local files and console output can be altered or deleted by an attacker or privileged insider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.