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Security audit

Use Smart Contract Platform

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for Circle smart-contract work, but it warrants review because its deployment examples handle high-impact blockchain actions with incomplete retry safeguards.

Install only in a project where Circle credentials are not exposed to frontend code, pin and review npm dependencies, use testnet by default, manually confirm any mainnet or value-moving action, and add idempotency keys to deployment examples before using them.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:17
Finding

Unpinned npm dependencies create supply-chain exposure

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/deploy-bytecode.md:45
Finding

Bytecode deployment example omits the required idempotency key

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/deploy-erc-1155.md:15
Finding

ERC-1155 template deployment example omits the required idempotency key

Content
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Remediation
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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 192)May include surrounding context.

md
- NEVER pass private keys as plain-text CLI flags (e.g., `--private-key $KEY`). Prefer encrypted keystores or interactive import (e.g., Foundry's `cast wallet import`).
- ALWAYS keep API keys and entity secrets server-side. NEVER expose in frontend code.
- NEVER reuse `idempotencyKey` values across different API requests.
- ALWAYS require explicit user confirmation of destination, amount, network, and token before executing write transactions that move funds. NEVER auto-execute fund movements on mainnet.
- ALWAYS warn when targeting mainnet or exceeding safety thresholds (e.g., >100 USDC).
- ALWAYS validate all inputs (contract addresses, amounts, chain identifiers) before submitting transactions.
- ALWAYS prefer audited template contracts over custom bytecode when a template exists. Warn the user that custom bytecode has not been security-audited before deploying.

Behavior Manipulation

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Subtle instructions detected that may alter agent decision-making or introduce hidden biases.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 195)May include surrounding context.

md
- ALWAYS require explicit user confirmation of destination, amount, network, and token before executing write transactions that move funds. NEVER auto-execute fund movements on mainnet.
- ALWAYS warn when targeting mainnet or exceeding safety thresholds (e.g., >100 USDC).
- ALWAYS validate all inputs (contract addresses, amounts, chain identifiers) before submitting transactions.
- ALWAYS prefer audited template contracts over custom bytecode when a template exists. Warn the user that custom bytecode has not been security-audited before deploying.
- NEVER deploy contracts designed to deceive, phish, or drain funds.
- ALWAYS warn before interacting with unaudited or unknown contracts.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The guidance instructs users to deploy arbitrary bytecode to a blockchain without an explicit warning that deployment is a state-changing, fee-consuming, and often irreversible action. In a smart-contract deployment skill, this omission can cause users to unintentionally spend funds, deploy to the wrong network, or publish unsafe code permanently, especially because the workflow is presented as a straightforward copy/paste procedure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.