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Security audit

Proxmox Full

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a legitimate Proxmox admin helper, but it gives an agent broad infrastructure control with weak safety guidance for credentials and destructive actions.

Install only if you intend to let an agent help administer Proxmox. Use a dedicated least-privilege token scoped to the needed nodes, pools, or VMs; keep privilege separation enabled where possible; configure trusted TLS instead of using -k; avoid plaintext passwords in commands; and require explicit human confirmation before stop, rollback, delete, purge, restore, clone, or template operations.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill documents irreversible deletion and purge operations for VMs and containers without any explicit confirmation, backup, or impact warning. In an agent-executed context, this increases the chance of accidental destructive actions that can permanently destroy workloads and associated disks.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
Snapshot rollback and deletion are operationally dangerous because rollback can overwrite current VM state and deletion can remove recovery points. Presenting these commands without warning or preconditions makes accidental data loss and service disruption more likely when used by an automated agent or hurried operator.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The setup instructions expose direct handling of a privileged Proxmox API token and even recommend disabling privilege separation, but provide no credential-handling safeguards. This is dangerous because tokens may be copied into shell history, logs, screenshots, or reused with excessive privileges, enabling broad infrastructure compromise if leaked.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
NEWID=$(curl -sk -H "$AUTH" "$PVE_URL/api2/json/cluster/nextid" | jq -r '.data')

# Create container
curl -sk -X POST -H "$AUTH" "$PVE_URL/api2/json/nodes/{node}/lxc" \
  -d "vmid=$NEWID" \
  -d "hostname=my-container" \
  -d "ostemplate=local:vztmpl/debian-12-standard_12.2-1_amd64.tar.zst" \
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
curl -sk -X POST -H "$AUTH" "$PVE_URL/api2/json/nodes/{node}/lxc" \ -d "vmid=$NEWID" \ -d "hostname=my-container" \ -d "ostemplate=local:vztmpl/debian-12-standard_12.2-1_amd64.tar.zst" \ -d "s

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.