T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
bin/fetch_url.py:10- Finding
Unrestricted URL Fetching Enables Server-Side Request Forgery
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This web-research skill is not clearly malicious, but it gives agents broad local execution and unsafe arbitrary URL/browser access that could expose local or internal data.
Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent fetch and render arbitrary web pages from the gateway and run local scripts. Prefer a hardened version that limits URLs to http/https public destinations, blocks private and local network ranges, keeps Chrome sandboxed in an isolated environment, bounds downloads and crawl limits, and requires explicit user approval before creating or executing new local programs.
bin/fetch_url.py:10Unrestricted URL Fetching Enables Server-Side Request Forgery
bin/render_url.py:8Chrome Argument Injection and Local-File Rendering Through Unvalidated Input
bin/render_url.py:10Headless Chrome Processes Untrusted Web Content Without a Sandbox
bin/fetch_url.py:17Unbounded Downloads and User-Controlled Crawl Limits Permit Resource Exhaustion
SKILL.md:34Skill Instructions Grant Excessive Gateway Command-Execution Authority
The invocation text is extremely broad: it authorizes aggressive web research, crawling, extraction, local scripting, and command execution with little task-bound scoping. In an agentic environment, this can cause the skill to be selected for many unrelated prompts and then grant high-risk capabilities, increasing the chance of unnecessary network access or local execution.
The skill explicitly permits writing and executing local Python or shell programs on the gateway and deleting temporary files, but it provides no guardrails around filesystem scope, privilege level, destructive commands, or handling of sensitive data. In a powerful gateway environment, this can lead to arbitrary code execution, data loss, persistence, or accidental modification of system and workspace contents.
This invokes a full browser on an attacker-controlled URL, which creates a server-side request forgery and untrusted content rendering primitive. Because Chrome is launched with '--no-sandbox', any browser exploit triggered by the remote page would execute without Chrome's normal containment, substantially increasing the risk of host compromise; even without RCE, it can be used to access internal network resources or cloud metadata endpoints and dump their rendered content.
"--dump-dom",
url,
]
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, text=True, capture_output=True)
if proc.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(proc.stderr)
sys.exit(proc.returncode)
This code file performs outbound HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs, which transmits system/network metadata such as the User-Agent and may contact arbitrary hosts, but the script provides no confirmation prompt, user-facing notice, or explanatory comment/docstring about that behavior. For a generic crawler utility, this network activity is safety-relevant and not explicitly disclosed within the file.
The script performs a server-side HTTP request to a fully user-supplied URL with no validation, allowlist, or warning. In an agent/skill context, this creates SSRF risk: an attacker can cause requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other sensitive network locations, and the fetched content is then parsed and returned to the caller.
The script performs a server-side HTTP request to a fully user-supplied URL with no validation, allowlist, or scheme restrictions. In an agent or automation context, this can enable SSRF behavior, allowing access to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other network-reachable resources that the caller should not be able to probe through the skill.