T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
skill.json:6- Finding
Funded Wallet Private Key Stored in Plaintext Configuration
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it says, but it asks for a wallet private key and can immediately make irreversible Base mainnet transactions with weak safeguards.
Review this carefully before installing. Use only a fresh low-balance wallet if direct private-key configuration is unavoidable, do not commit or share the config file, verify the chain and contract before every run, and only provide image paths you have manually checked. Prefer a version that uses an external wallet/signer and requires explicit confirmation before broadcasting a transaction.
skill.json:6Funded Wallet Private Key Stored in Plaintext Configuration
skill.js:54Arbitrary Local File Can Be Uploaded to Ape.Store as an Image
SKILL.md:13Irreversible Blockchain Transaction Executes Without Final Informed Confirmation
The lockfile pins form-data to 4.0.5, which the supplied advisory data identifies as vulnerable to CRLF injection in multipart field names/filenames. If this skill constructs multipart requests from untrusted input, an attacker could manipulate request structure or inject unintended headers/body parts, which is especially relevant because this package is a direct dependency of the skill rather than an unused transitive package.
The lockfile includes ws 8.17.1 via ethers, and the provided advisories indicate memory disclosure and memory-exhaustion denial-of-service issues. In a skill context that may connect to blockchain/WebSocket endpoints, malformed or attacker-controlled websocket traffic could crash the process or expose memory contents, making this dependency riskier than a purely dormant library.
form-data 4.0.5 is flagged with a known high-severity advisory for CRLF injection in multipart field names. If this package is used to build multipart requests with attacker-influenced field names or filenames, an attacker may be able to inject crafted headers or manipulate downstream HTTP request structure, potentially leading to request smuggling-like effects, header injection, or abuse of integrated services.
The manifest explicitly includes a privateKey configuration field, which encourages users to place a highly sensitive secret directly into skill configuration. In an agent-skill context, this creates a serious risk of secret exposure through logs, config syncing, prompt leakage, or unintended downstream tool access, and compromise of the key would allow full control over the associated wallet on Base mainnet.
The installation instructions tell the user to place a wallet private key into a local configuration file, but provide no warning about the sensitivity of the secret or the risk of theft from disk, source control, logs, backups, or other local compromise. Because this skill is explicitly used to create on-chain assets and spend gas from a real wallet on BASE, exposing the private key could lead to unauthorized transactions and full wallet compromise.
The skill directs the agent to perform a real on-chain token deployment on BASE via Ape.Store, but provides no required user warning, confirmation gate, or disclosure that the action is irreversible and may incur financial cost. Because it tells the agent to ALWAYS run the command and return the TX hash/block number, a user could trigger an unintended live deployment with permanent blockchain and reputational consequences.
The code invokes a privileged blockchain operation using a locally configured private key and RPC endpoint with no visible authorization checks, purpose limitation, or manifest describing intended use. In an agent-skill context, this enables asset creation on behalf of the configured wallet, which can lead to unauthorized token deployment, fees charged to the wallet, and abuse of on-chain identity or reputation.
The skill reads a private key from configuration and uses it to sign or authorize a blockchain transaction without any user warning or confirmation. This creates a hidden credential-use path: anyone able to trigger the skill may cause sensitive wallet actions, consuming funds and performing irreversible on-chain operations under the owner's identity.
The manifest explicitly requires a private key in configuration, but provides no warning, secure handling guidance, or safer credential mechanism. In a skill that creates blockchain tokens on mainnet, this is security-relevant because users may paste a real wallet private key into plaintext config, increasing the risk of wallet compromise, unauthorized transactions, and accidental exposure through logs, source control, or skill sharing.
The skill transmits user-supplied token metadata and the wallet-derived creator address to an external third-party API, and may also upload a local file from imagePath. In an agent-skill context this is security-relevant because it causes off-platform data exfiltration and triggers blockchain-related actions based on unverified remote responses, which increases privacy, integrity, and supply-chain risk.
console.log(" Image attached: " + resolvedPath);
}
const apiResponse = await fetch("https://ape.store/api/token", {
method: "POST",
body: form,
headers: form.getHeaders(),
The skill advertises token creation on https://mainnet.base.org, which can trigger real, irreversible on-chain transactions, yet the description and manifest provide no warning about financial cost, permanence, or risk. In an agent-driven setting, missing safety disclosures increases the chance that a user invokes the skill without understanding that it can create assets or spend funds on mainnet.
The dependency version for ethers is specified with a caret range, which permits automatic installation of newer minor/patch releases rather than a single audited version. This increases supply-chain risk and reduces build reproducibility, though by itself it is not evidence of active compromise.
"license": "ISC",
"type": "commonjs",
"dependencies": {
"ethers": "^6.16.0",
"form-data": "^4.0.5",
"node-fetch": "^2.7.0"
}
The form-data dependency is unpinned, allowing unreviewed upstream releases to be installed, which is a supply-chain hygiene issue. In this case the risk is amplified because the currently referenced version is also separately flagged as vulnerable, making dependency control especially important.
"type": "commonjs",
"dependencies": {
"ethers": "^6.16.0",
"form-data": "^4.0.5",
"node-fetch": "^2.7.0"
}
}
The node-fetch dependency is declared with a caret range, so installations may resolve to different code over time. This weakens reproducibility and can expose the project to unexpected vulnerable or malicious upstream changes.
"dependencies": {
"ethers": "^6.16.0",
"form-data": "^4.0.5",
"node-fetch": "^2.7.0"
}
}