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Security audit

网站测试安全规则

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent authorized web-testing rule set, but it includes documented bypass switches that can weaken authorization, destructive-action, and third-party-scope controls.

Review before installing. Use this only for clearly authorized testing, prefer signed `AUTHORIZATION.json`, avoid `auth.disable` and `MOWEN_AUTH_OVERRIDE` bypasses, do not allow destructive or third-party tests without separate written scope, and keep reports in a private authorized location with sensitive data redacted.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
locales/en/SKILL.md:195
Finding

Project-Controlled Switch Can Bypass Authorization and Backup Requirements for Destructive Operations

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
locales/en/SKILL.md:205
Finding

Local Marker Substitutes for Independent Authorization to Test External Third-Party Systems

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
locales/en/SKILL.md:371
Finding

SSRF Guidance Explicitly Encourages Cloud Metadata and Internal Protocol Probing

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
locales/en/SKILL.md:81
Finding

Authorization Verification Can Be Disabled Through Untrusted Project or Environment State

Content
View full analysis
The escape hatch is a "known risk, actively disable verification" switch, not authorization itself. - **Non-destructive escape hatch `mowenfalse`**: if the project is clearly authorized and wants to skip **authorization verification** (for **non-destructive testing only**), create `auth.disable` in **this skill's project directory** with content `mowenfalse` (or set env `MOWEN_AUTH_OVERRIDE=mowenfalse`). Detected → skip authorization verification; **scope constraints still apply (must not cross authorized scope, see rule 23)**. - **Destructive escape hatch `mowenbrokentrue`**: destructive operations (rule 22) require explicit authorization + pre-backup by default. With `mowenbrokentrue` in `auth.disable` (or env `MOWEN_AUTH_OVERRIDE=mowenbrokentrue`), the **explicit-authorization requirement** for destructive ops may be skipped (destructive actions allowed without `scope.destructive.allowed=true`). **Note: `mowenbrokentrue` can only skip authorization, NOT backup** — regardless of setting, a recoverable backup MUST be made before any destructive action (rules 22, A5); backup is never waived. - **Still leave a trace after disabling**: report labels "authorization gate disabled (mowenfalse / mowenbrokentrue)" and reaffirms "for authorized targets only". - ⚠️ The escape hatch is merely a convenience, **does not ...[truncated 1993 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (49)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

3. 清理临时目录(可选)

bash
rm -rf /tmp/web-security-test-rules

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

3. 清理临时目录(可选)

bash
rm -rf /tmp/web-security-test-rules

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

3. 清理临时目录(可选)

bash
rm -rf /tmp/web-security-test-rules

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

3. 清理临时目录(可选)

bash
rm -rf /tmp/web-security-test-rules

Ssd 1

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The README defines intentionally obfuscated 'escape hatch' values, including one that explicitly skips authorization verification. Hidden bypass tokens materially undermine the claimed safety model and make unauthorized security testing easier, especially because the surrounding skill context is web security testing where authorization is the primary control.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 158)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 卸载当前项目中的 Skill
rm -rf .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules

# 卸载全局 Skill
rm -rf ~/.codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 161)May include surrounding context.

rm -rf .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules

卸载全局 Skill

rm -rf ~/.codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules

text

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 161)May include surrounding context.

rm -rf .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules

卸载全局 Skill

rm -rf ~/.codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules

text

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Rule 22 is internally inconsistent: earlier text says mowenbrokentrue cannot bypass backups, but the later clause says it can skip the mandatory 'explicit authorization + backup first' requirement. In an adversarial or rushed operational context, the weaker interpretation could be used to justify destructive actions without recoverable backups, creating real risk of irreversible data loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill introduces an escape hatch that weakens destructive-operation safeguards by allowing mowenbrokentrue to bypass explicit destructive authorization, while adjacent text elsewhere says those controls are mandatory and non-waivable. In a security-testing skill, this contradiction is dangerous because an agent or operator may rely on the weaker branch and perform destructive actions without clear authorization, increasing the risk of unauthorized data loss or service impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Rule 22 first states backup is mandatory and not waivable, but later redefines mowenbrokentrue as enabling a 'destructive one-click' mode that skips the same gate. This creates a policy inconsistency at the most sensitive point in the skill and can directly normalize or authorize high-risk destructive behavior under unclear conditions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Cloud Metadata Access

High
Category
Server-Side Request Forgery
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 376)May include surrounding context.

md
- **D3 Business logic / concurrency**: race conditions (concurrent coupon / transfer / order), negative / over-limit, duplicate submission, flow bypass (skip validation steps).
- **D4 Privilege-escalation combos**: vertical + horizontal escalation combos, IDOR bulk traversal, enumerable UUID / sequence, function-level escalation (change role param).
- **D5 Injection extensions**: command injection, XXE, SSTI, deserialization, LDAP / NoSQL injection (not limited to SQL / XSS).
- **D6 SSRF**: internal / metadata probing (e.g. `169.254.169.254`), DNS rebinding, protocol tunneling (gopher / file); probe only, don't read large sensitive data. **SSRF PoC must not point to external third-party systems outside authorized scope — must not use the target server as an attack springboard to hit off-site / real-internal third parties**.
- **D7 File upload**: type / content bypass (webshell), path traversal, decompression bomb, overwrite existing files; use harmless samples, delete after testing.
- **D8 Info leak**: `.git` / `.env` / backup exposure, unauthorized Swagger / Docs, verbose errors / stack traces, directory listing.
- **D9 Config & transport**: missing security headers (CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options), Cookie attributes (Secure / HttpOnly / SameSite), weak TLS config, CORS misconfig.

Cloud Metadata Access

High
Category
Server-Side Request Forgery
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.

Content

Scanner excerpt · locales/en/SKILL.md (reported line 371)May include surrounding context.

md
- **D3 Business logic / concurrency**: race conditions (concurrent coupon / transfer / order), negative / over-limit, duplicate submission, flow bypass (skip validation steps).
- **D4 Privilege-escalation combos**: vertical + horizontal escalation combos, IDOR bulk traversal, enumerable UUID / sequence, function-level escalation (change role param).
- **D5 Injection extensions**: command injection, XXE, SSTI, deserialization, LDAP / NoSQL injection (not limited to SQL / XSS).
- **D6 SSRF**: internal / metadata probing (e.g. `169.254.169.254`), DNS rebinding, protocol tunneling (gopher / file); probe only, don't read large sensitive data. **SSRF PoC must not point to external third-party systems outside authorized scope — must not use the target server as an attack springboard to hit off-site / real-internal third parties**.
- **D7 File upload**: type / content bypass (webshell), path traversal, decompression bomb, overwrite existing files; use harmless samples, delete after testing.
- **D8 Info leak**: `.git` / `.env` / backup exposure, unauthorized Swagger / Docs, verbose errors / stack traces, directory listing.
- **D9 Config & transport**: missing security headers (CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options), Cookie attributes (Secure / HttpOnly / SameSite), weak TLS config, CORS misconfig.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · locales/en/SKILL.md (reported line 372)May include surrounding context.

md
- **D4 Privilege-escalation combos**: vertical + horizontal escalation combos, IDOR bulk traversal, enumerable UUID / sequence, function-level escalation (change role param).
- **D5 Injection extensions**: command injection, XXE, SSTI, deserialization, LDAP / NoSQL injection (not limited to SQL / XSS).
- **D6 SSRF**: internal / metadata probing (e.g. `169.254.169.254`), DNS rebinding, protocol tunneling (gopher / file); probe only, don't read large sensitive data. **SSRF PoC must not point to external third-party systems outside authorized scope — must not use the target server as an attack springboard to hit off-site / real-internal third parties**.
- **D7 File upload**: type / content bypass (webshell), path traversal, decompression bomb, overwrite existing files; use harmless samples, delete after testing.
- **D8 Info leak**: `.git` / `.env` / backup exposure, unauthorized Swagger / Docs, verbose errors / stack traces, directory listing.
- **D9 Config & transport**: missing security headers (CSP / HSTS / X-Frame-Options), Cookie attributes (Secure / HttpOnly / SameSite), weak TLS config, CORS misconfig.
- **D10 Supply chain / components**: component fingerprinting + known CVE, debug endpoint exposure (actuator / phpinfo), dependency vulnerabilities.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · locales/en/references/authorization_template.json (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

json
"destructive": {
      "allowed": false,
      "items": [
        "DELETE /api/orders/*",
        "DROP TABLE temp_test"
      ],
      "backup_required": true,

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/authorization_template.json (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

json
"destructive": {
      "allowed": false,
      "items": [
        "DELETE /api/orders/*",
        "DROP TABLE temp_test"
      ],
      "backup_required": true,

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · locales/en/references/backup_notes.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

text
### 破坏性操作备份记录
- 操作:<DELETE /api/orders/12345>
- 影响资源:<订单表 order_id=12345>
- 备份方式:<数据库导出>
- 备份位置:</backups/2026-08-15/orders_12345.sql>

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/backup_notes.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

text
### 破坏性操作备份记录
- 操作:<DELETE /api/orders/12345>
- 影响资源:<订单表 order_id=12345>
- 备份方式:<数据库导出>
- 备份位置:</backups/2026-08-15/orders_12345.sql>

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

2. 复制为当前项目下的一个 skill 目录

bash
mkdir -p .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules
cp -r /tmp/web-security-test-rules/. .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules/

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

2. 复制为当前项目下的一个 skill 目录

bash
mkdir -p .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules
cp -r /tmp/web-security-test-rules/. .codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules/

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

md
> 💡 说明:
> - `cp -r 源/. 目标/` 末尾的 `/.` 表示复制目录的**全部内容**(含隐藏文件),并避免多嵌套一层目录。
> - Windows 用户若无 `git` / `cp`,可用 Git Bash;或下载仓库 zip 解压后,将仓库内容整体放入 `.codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules/`。
> - 安装后的目录结构应为:`.codebuddy/skills/web-security-test-rules/SKILL.md`,CodeBuddy 据此识别该 Skill。

---

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The activation keywords are broad terms like '安全测试', '渗透测试', and '隐蔽测试', which can trigger in ordinary discussion rather than an intentional invocation. In an agent skill that may alter behavior around security testing, overbroad triggers increase the chance of accidental activation and unsafe workflow changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README claims the skill enforces signed authorization checks and generates reports, but this file provides only documentation and no verifiable implementation of those controls. In a security-testing skill, overstating safety gates can mislead users into believing unauthorized or unsafe behavior is technically prevented when it may not be.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs writing reports and error logs to the filesystem, but it does not declare an allowlist such as permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch weakens least-privilege controls: an agent may obtain broader file-write behavior than a reviewer expects, increasing the chance of overwriting files or persisting sensitive security-test artifacts in unintended locations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates generating, storing, sharing, and archiving security test reports that may include requests, responses, findings, and operational details, but it does not put a strong top-level privacy warning or strict minimization controls around that data handling. Because penetration-test artifacts often contain credentials, internal URLs, PII, or proof-of-access data, this creates a meaningful confidentiality and retention risk if reports are overshared or stored insecurely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.