T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:114
- Finding
- Private Channel Content and Metadata Disclosure to Third-Party Telegram Bots## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 114–118 **Vulnerability Type**: Disclosure of private channel data to unverified third-party services **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable snippet**: ```markdown Steps to relay: 1. Get the channel's **Chat ID**. There are a few ways: - Forward any message from the channel to the bot **@userinfobot** or **@getidsbot** — it will report the channel's chat ID (usually a negative number like `-100xxxxxxxxxx`). - Or check your OpenClaw dashboard/settings if it provides a way to detect channels the bot is already in. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs users to forward a Telegram channel message to one of two third-party bots to obtain the channel ID. This operation may disclose the forwarded message body, forwarding attribution, channel identity, and related Telegram metadata to an external service whose ownership, data-retention policy, and trustworthiness are not established by the project. The instruction does not warn users about the disclosure, require informed consent, or limit the forwarded content to a newly created non-sensitive test message. This is particularly significant because the skill recommends private channels elsewhere in the document. The channel ID can instead be obtained through a trusted OpenClaw interface or Telegram Bot API data under the user's control, making third-party disclosure unnecessary. No evidence indicates that the named bots are malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe recommendation to transmit potentially sensitive channel data to unverified third parties without adequate safeguards. ### Attack Path 1. A user creates or joins a Telegram channel, potentially configured as private. 2. The user follows the skill and selects an existing channel message. 3. The user forwards that message to `@userinfobot` or `@getidsbot`. 4. The third-party bot receives the forwarded content and any metadata Telegram exposes ...[truncated 1124 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the recommendation to forward channel messages to third-party Telegram bots. 2. Prefer trusted methods under the user's control, such as: - Reading the chat ID from OpenClaw's channel configuration or event logs. - Obtaining the ID from Telegram Bot API updates received by the user's own bot. - Using an authenticated administrative interface operated by the user or OpenClaw. 3. If the third-party method must remain as a fallback: - Clearly identify the recipients as external services. - Warn that forwarding may disclose message content and channel metadata. - Require explicit user consent before recommending the operation. - Instruct the user to create and forward a new, non-sensitive test message rather than an existing conversation. - Advise the user to review the third party's ownership, privacy policy, and retention practices. - Present the method only after trusted alternatives have failed. 4. Minimize disclosure by documenting a procedure that retrieves only the numeric chat ID without transmitting conversation content.
