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Security audit

Genexxis live market data: crypto, DeFi, odds, rates, FX

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is suspicious because the skill repeatedly uses an unpinned `npx agentcash` command, so the installed package could change without review; the scanners do not report clear malicious intent.

Consider waiting to install until the CLI dependency is pinned to a reviewed version and its installation is integrity-checked. Skillspector’s coverage was partial because a local reference could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete; the AIG scan reported no findings.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (25)

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The command runs agentcash@latest, a mutable npm release, rather than a reviewed, fixed version. Although this is a CLI rather than an MCP server, a compromised release could execute code with the agent's permissions and potentially access wallet material; payment caps do not constrain that code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is another occurrence of the same mutable agentcash@latest dependency, not an independent attack mechanism. Even a price-check command executes the downloaded CLI, so a compromised release could access local files or wallet material before any payment occurs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This occurrence also invokes the mutable agentcash@latest package, sharing the same supply-chain weakness as the other commands on this line. The accounts operation is especially sensitive because the CLI manages wallet-related state, which a compromised release could access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The spot-price example executes agentcash@latest, allowing the executable package to change without review. A compromised release could run code with the agent's permissions and potentially access wallet secrets, regardless of the small per-call payment cap.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The DEX-price example invokes the mutable agentcash@latest npm release rather than a fixed, reviewed executable. A compromised release could access local data or wallet material; the advertised payment cap would not sandbox its behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The OHLCV example executes agentcash@latest, so a future package release can change the code run by the agent. Compromise of that release could expose local files or wallet material even though the requested market-data operation is read-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The movers example relies on the mutable agentcash@latest release, creating a supply-chain execution risk. A malicious replacement release could run with the agent's permissions, and the payment cap does not prevent access to files or wallet secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The funding-rate command executes an unfixed agentcash@latest release. If that release is compromised, it could execute arbitrary code in the agent environment and potentially compromise the payment wallet despite the nominally small charge.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The open-interest example uses agentcash@latest, making the code selected by the command mutable. A compromised package could access local secrets or wallet state; endpoint and payee restrictions do not constrain malicious local code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The funding-extremes example invokes a mutable npm release through agentcash@latest. A compromised release could execute code with the agent's privileges and potentially access wallet material, independently of the API's payment controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The slippage example runs agentcash@latest instead of a reviewed fixed release. Although the API operation is only a simulation, a compromised CLI could still access local files and payment-wallet material.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The DeFi-yields example executes the mutable agentcash@latest package, exposing the agent to unreviewed release changes. A compromised release could run arbitrary code or access wallet secrets, and the per-call payment limit would not stop that behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The protocol-TVL example uses agentcash@latest, so the executable dependency can change without a skill update. A malicious release could compromise the execution environment or payment wallet despite the read-only nature of the data request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The pool-data example invokes the mutable agentcash@latest release. Compromise of that release could permit code execution and access to local wallet material; the documented payee check protects payments only when the executing client remains trustworthy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The gas-price example executes agentcash@latest rather than a fixed reviewed package. A compromised release could access local files or wallet secrets, so the low API price does not bound the potential impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The cheapest-chain example runs a mutable npm release through agentcash@latest. A compromised CLI could execute code with the agent's permissions and potentially access its payment wallet even though this command only requests a recommendation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The odds-search example selects agentcash@latest, permitting executable code changes without review. A compromised release could access local data and wallet material; payment approval and price caps do not sandbox package execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The top-markets example executes the mutable agentcash@latest package. If a malicious release is published, it could execute code in the agent environment and potentially access wallet secrets independently of the requested API payment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The crypto-news example runs agentcash@latest, allowing future package releases to change the executed code. A compromised CLI could access local secrets or wallet state even if the agent correctly treats returned news as untrusted data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The bond-yield example invokes the mutable agentcash@latest npm release. A compromised release could execute arbitrary code with the agent's permissions and potentially compromise wallet material; the small payment cap does not limit this exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The yield-curve example executes agentcash@latest rather than a fixed, reviewed release. A compromised package could access local files and wallet material, irrespective of the legitimacy of the market-data endpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The policy-rates example depends on the mutable agentcash@latest release. A compromised release could execute code in the agent's environment and potentially access wallet secrets, which the documented payment checks do not prevent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The FX example executes agentcash@latest, so the package code can change without review or a skill revision. A compromised release could access sensitive local data or wallet state despite the request being a read-only exchange-rate lookup.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The conversion example invokes a mutable npm release through agentcash@latest. A malicious release could execute code with the agent's privileges and potentially access wallet material, even though this endpoint merely calculates a conversion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx agentcash'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The carry-ranking example executes agentcash@latest rather than a fixed reviewed release. A compromised package could access local secrets or wallet material; price caps and payee restrictions do not constrain malicious executable code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.