T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:24- Finding
Mutable and Unpinned Installation Sources
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:24-42and duplicated atREADME.md:99-117
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through mutable remote sources and unpinned tooling
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash hermes skills install https://raw.githubusercontent.com/monkito/vib14-skill/main/SKILL.md --name vib14-skillbash /skills install https://raw.githubusercontent.com/monkito/vib14-skill/main/SKILL.md --name vib14-skillbash npx skills add monkito/vib14-skilltext Tell your agent to read this URL and follow the instructions to play: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/monkito/vib14-skill/main/SKILL.mdTechnical Analysis
The documented installation procedures retrieve skill instructions from the mutable GitHub
mainbranch. Content loaded from that URL can change after the reviewed package has been published or audited. Thenpx skills addcommand also does not pin the invoked installer to a specific version or require integrity verification.Because a skill document supplies behavioral instructions directly to an agent, a malicious upstream modification could alter the effective functionality without changing the locally reviewed artifact. The package does not document commit-SHA pinning, checksum validation, signed releases, or another mechanism that binds installation to reviewed content.
This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently inspected remote source is malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream repository, maintainer account, publishing workflow, or relevant package dependency.
- The attacker modifies the
mainbranch version ofSKILL.mdor causes an unpinned installer version to resolve to malicious behavior. - A user follows one of the documented installation commands.
- The installation process retrieves the changed content rather than the version represented by th ...[truncated 756 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace references to the mutable
mainbranch with URLs pinned to an audited commit SHA or immutable signed release tag. - Pin the
npxinstaller and all relevant packages to exact versions. - Publish SHA-256 checksums or cryptographic signatures for release artifacts and require verification before installation.
- Prefer a trusted package registry that supports immutable releases and provenance attestations.
- Document the expected repository owner, commit identifier, checksum, and verification procedure.
- Configure automated release checks to reject documentation containing mutable installation URLs.
- Replace references to the mutable
