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Security audit

microtypography

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a scoped microtypography helper that edits text formatting and only writes files or Figma nodes after user permission.

Before installing, be aware that the skill can change text by inserting invisible or subtle Unicode spacing characters and, when given Figma access, can edit selected text nodes after you approve it. Use the change log to review those edits, especially in multilingual content or systems with strict copy/localization rules.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The 'When To Use' section includes the trigger phrase 'polish this text', which is a generic editing request rather than a narrowly scoped microtypography invocation. Although other examples are specific, this broad phrase could cause the skill to activate for ordinary proofreading or copyediting requests outside its intended scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/test-results.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
# Microtypography skill — test run

Manual dry-run of `skills/microtypography/SKILL.md` against four cases: PL reflowing markdown, EN reflowing markdown (strict mode), Case A hard-wrapped rewrap, Case B soft-hyphen + CSS suggestion. Run by following the skill's own Steps 1–5 and Quality Checklist.

**Notation used below** (source markdown would contain the real invisible characters, not these glyphs):
- `␣` = non-breaking space (U+00A0)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The input specification says to 'detect per-paragraph if mixed,' which imposes language handling automatically rather than offering the user a language/locale choice. This is a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill decides locale behavior on the user's behalf unless ambiguity is detected later.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Step 1 instructs the skill to 'Detect language per paragraph (or ask if ambiguous),' which makes language selection automatic by default. This can conflict with organizational language/locale choice expectations because the user is not given an explicit choice unless the system finds ambiguity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.