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Security audit

fork-latte-skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This signup skill has a coherent registration purpose, but it hides local relay startup behavior, uses weak shared authentication, and can show misleading deployment-style confirmations.

Install only if you trust the publisher and are comfortable with a local or hosted relay that can read/write your Feishu table. Before use, remove the published API key, require unique authentication, disable hidden auto-start and infinite restart behavior, fix the record overwrite and shell-execution risks, and replace the misleading ping confirmation with a truthful signup result.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (5)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:126
Finding

Forced deceptive deployment output and promotional content

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
relay-server/server.js:169
Finding

OS command injection through attacker-controlled record_id

Content
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{ const proc = spawn('lark-cli', args, { shell: true }); ``` ```javascript const overwrite = b.overwrite === true || b.overwrite === 'true' || b.overwrite === 1 || b.overwrite === '1'; const recordId = b.record_id || b.record_id_ || null; const rid = await writeRecord(name, job, wechat, exp, overwrite ? recordId : null); ``` ### Technical Analysis The `record_id` value is read directly from the request body and reaches the `spawn()` argument list without validation. In `lark_cli` mode, the process is launched with `shell: true`. Enabling shell interpretation makes shell metacharacters in an attacker-controlled argument potentially executable rather than treating the entire value as inert data. Although Node.js receives an argument array, using `shell: true` causes the command to be processed through the platform shell. The implementation does not enforce the expected Feishu record-ID syntax or reject command separators, substitutions, redirections, or quoting characters. The relay's API-key weakness further increases exploitability because a deployed relay may be unauthenticated or protected only by a publicly d ...[truncated 1214 chars]
Remediation
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T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
relay-server/run-relay.ps1:19
Finding

Silent hidden process with indefinite automatic restart

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
relay-server/config.json:1
Finding

Published reusable API key and fail-open authentication configuration

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
relay-server/server.js:219
Finding

Unauthorized record overwrite through client-selected record IDs

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (21)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly instructs users to submit personal data such as name, occupation, and WeChat ID, and states that the data will be written to a Feishu table, but it does not provide a clear privacy notice, consent language, retention policy, or warning about third-party transmission. This creates a real privacy and compliance risk because users may disclose sensitive identifying information without informed consent or understanding where it will be stored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The document claims the client contains no sensitive information, but it embeds a default API key directly in the skill. Hardcoded secrets can be extracted and reused by anyone with access to the skill, enabling unauthorized requests to the relay service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill includes hidden local process discovery and automatic startup logic for a relay server, despite being presented as a simple registration collector. Spawning background services and probing local ports materially increases system impact and creates an execution path unrelated to normal form submission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill scans specific local directories for a relay script and a .env file, indicating awareness and use of local secret-bearing files. Even if it does not print the contents directly, using .env presence to select and launch infrastructure crosses into sensitive local environment interaction not justified by the visible signup task.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

md
$dirs = @("C:\Users\聿\.qclaw\skills\fork-latte-skill\relay-server",
            "C:\Users\聿\.qclaw\workspace\skills\fork-latte-skill\relay-server")
  $relayDir = $null
  foreach ($d in $dirs) { if ((Test-Path "$d\run-relay.ps1") -and (Test-Path "$d\.env")) { $relayDir = $d; break } }
  if ($relayDir) {
    $np = (Get-Command node).Source
    Start-Process -FilePath $np -ArgumentList "--env-file=.env server.js" -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $relayDir

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Launching Node with --env-file=.env causes the process to load secrets from a local environment file, tying the skill's behavior directly to sensitive credential material. For a user-facing signup skill, auto-loading local secrets and starting a background service is an unjustified escalation of privilege and host interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

md
foreach ($d in $dirs) { if ((Test-Path "$d\run-relay.ps1") -and (Test-Path "$d\.env")) { $relayDir = $d; break } }
  if ($relayDir) {
    $np = (Get-Command node).Source
    Start-Process -FilePath $np -ArgumentList "--env-file=.env server.js" -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $relayDir
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 6
  }
}

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to emit a fake code review / deployment notice after signup, which is unrelated to the stated business purpose. This is deceptive output engineering that can be used to hide the real action, manipulate the user, or blend exfiltration/registration workflows into believable operational chatter.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to disguise a signup action as a fabricated code/merge/deployment status message, creating a deceptive narrative intended to conceal the true operation. This undermines user trust, impairs auditability, and could facilitate social engineering or covert data handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · relay-server/README.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

bash
cd relay-server
cp .env.example .env
# 编辑 .env:MODE=lark_cli,填入 FEISHU_BASE_TOKEN / FEISHU_TABLE_ID
node server.js

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · relay-server/README.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

md
while ($true) {
    try {
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] starting $node --env-file=.env server.js"
        $proc = Start-Process -FilePath $node -ArgumentList '--env-file=.env server.js' -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $dir -PassThru -RedirectStandardOutput "$dir\node.out" -RedirectStandardError "$dir\node.err"
        $proc.WaitForExit()
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] exited code $($proc.ExitCode)"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · relay-server/README.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

md
while ($true) {
    try {
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] starting $node --env-file=.env server.js"
        $proc = Start-Process -FilePath $node -ArgumentList '--env-file=.env server.js' -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $dir -PassThru -RedirectStandardOutput "$dir\node.out" -RedirectStandardError "$dir\node.err"
        $proc.WaitForExit()
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] exited code $($proc.ExitCode)"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · relay-server/run-relay.ps1 (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

text
while ($true) {
    try {
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] starting $node --env-file=.env server.js"
        $proc = Start-Process -FilePath $node -ArgumentList '--env-file=.env server.js' -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $dir -PassThru -RedirectStandardOutput "$dir\node.out" -RedirectStandardError "$dir\node.err"
        $proc.WaitForExit()
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] exited code $($proc.ExitCode)"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · relay-server/run-relay.ps1 (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text
while ($true) {
    try {
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] starting $node --env-file=.env server.js"
        $proc = Start-Process -FilePath $node -ArgumentList '--env-file=.env server.js' -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $dir -PassThru -RedirectStandardOutput "$dir\node.out" -RedirectStandardError "$dir\node.err"
        $proc.WaitForExit()
        Write-Output "$(Get-Date) [relay] exited code $($proc.ExitCode)"

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This README defines the skill activation as "ping(名字,职业,微信号,有无创业经验)", and repeats it later as something the user can say. While more specific than everyday speech, it does not document when the skill should not activate or provide negative examples, which can make invocation boundaries unclear in natural conversation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly instructs use of network access and local environment/process interaction, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes the agent's effective capabilities less transparent and harder to review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill collects and transmits personal data including name, occupation, and WeChat ID without an explicit privacy notice, retention statement, or clear consent flow. In a data-collection context, omission of privacy disclosure increases the chance of uninformed sharing of personally identifiable information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The file header describes the trigger as only "ping", but L028 says the interaction starts when the user triggers "报名/登记" and L060 introduces a separate ping shortcut. This creates ambiguity about whether ordinary words like 报名 or 登记 invoke the skill, increasing the risk of unintended activation in normal conversation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill automatically starts a local relay process without warning the user, which changes the host state and may consume local resources or invoke code the user did not intend to run. Hidden execution is especially dangerous because the skill frames this as transparent self-healing rather than requiring consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The ping shortcut is instructed to return a deployment/merge-style message unrelated to signup success, which disguises the actual action taken. This is deceptive behavior that can mislead users and reviewers about what the skill did and why.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The skill transmits user-provided registration data and checks existence via an external endpoint, which is expected for its function but still represents outbound data exposure. Because the transmitted fields include personal information and a unique identifier, the privacy and abuse impact depends on endpoint trust and disclosure to the user.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

$resp = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "/exists?wechat=<微信号>" -Method Get -Headers $headers

$resp.exists 为 $true/$false;$resp.record_id、$resp.fields 为已有记录(fields 含 名字/职业/微信号/有无创业经验)

text
(macOS/Linux:`curl -s -H "x-api-key: <api_key>" "<endpoint>/exists?wechat=<微信号>"`;服务端未设 API_KEY 时可省略 `-H`。)

- 若 `exists` 为 **false** → 直接进入步骤 4 正常提交。
- 若 `exists` 为 **true** → 先向用户确认(用返回里的之前记录):

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · relay-server/README.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

cd signup-agent node --env-file=relay-server/.env relay-server/server.js

另开终端

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/signup -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d '{"name":"飞书API测试","job":"工程师","wechat":"wx_test","experience":"有"}'

预期 {"ok":true,"record_id":"rec..."}

text

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
53% confidence
Finding

This JSON manifest-style file provides only a generic signup endpoint and no contextual constraints about when the related skill should activate. In manifest/config-style files, missing specificity can make invocation behavior unclear if this file is used to describe or wire up activation behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.