Super Lap Agentos Api V3 Diary Call Group

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 9:54 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill is mostly a straightforward API reference for diary appointments, but it enables real appointment changes and includes unpinned command examples that could execute changing third-party code.

Review this skill before installing. Use a least-privileged API key, require explicit confirmation before creating, updating, cancelling, or deleting appointments, and avoid running the documented `npx @lap-platform/lapsh` commands unless you pin and trust the package version or run them in an isolated environment.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:71

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution Through npx

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 71–76
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: Medium

bash

# Update this spec to the latest version
npx @lap-platform/lapsh get agentos-api-v3-diary-call-group -o references/api-spec.lap

# Search for related APIs
npx @lap-platform/lapsh search agentos-api-v3-diary-call-group

Technical Analysis

The documented commands invoke @lap-platform/lapsh through npx without specifying an exact package version, integrity hash, or lockfile. If the package is not already available locally, npx may retrieve and execute the package currently published under that name in the configured registry.

Consequently, the code executed by these commands can differ from the code that existed when the Skill was reviewed. The project also refers users to references/api-spec.lap, but that file is absent from the audited package, making execution of the mutable external dependency a likely way to obtain the advertised specification.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently published package is malicious.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package release process, or upstream registry distribution channel.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious or compromised version of @lap-platform/lapsh.
3. A user or Agent follows the commands documented in SKILL.md.
4. npx retrieves the unpinned package version from the registry and executes its package code locally.
5. The malicious package runs with the privileges and environment of the invoking process.
6. It may read accessible files or environment variables, alter generated artifacts, or perform unauthorized network and API operations.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation would provide code execution under the invoking user's operating-system privileges. The accessible scope may include project files, user-readable local data, network res ...[truncated 452 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin @lap-platform/lapsh to an exact, reviewed version rather than allowing npx to resolve the latest release.
2. Install dependencies through a committed lockfile and enforce package integrity verification in automated workflows.
3. Bundle the required references/api-spec.lap file with the Skill so ordinary use does not require downloading and executing a mutable package.
4. Review the pinned package source, lifecycle scripts, transitive dependencies, and publication provenance before approval.
5. Run any required specification-update command in an isolated, least-privileged environment without API keys or unrelated sensitive environment variables.
6. Restrict outbound network access and filesystem permissions during dependency execution where operationally practical.
7. Use trusted registry configuration and package provenance or signature verification when supported.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

The skill description is broadly framed around managing diary call groups and automation, but it does not define clear trigger boundaries, approval requirements, or exclusions for sensitive actions. In an agent setting, vague scope increases the chance the skill is invoked for unintended requests and may perform impactful API operations, including modifying or deleting scheduling data, without sufficient user confirmation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill exposes destructive endpoints for deleting and cancelling appointments but provides no warning about irreversible or business-impacting effects. In an automated workflow, omission of safety guidance can lead to accidental cancellations or deletions of real appointments, causing operational disruption and possible data integrity issues.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to run an unpinned NPX package, which allows whatever version is current at execution time to be fetched and executed. If the upstream package is compromised, typosquatted, or publishes a malicious update, this becomes a supply-chain execution path from documentation to code execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

This is a second occurrence of the same supply-chain risk: the documentation references npx @lap-platform/lapsh without a fixed version, causing users or agents to execute an uncontrolled latest package. In an automation context, that can turn a routine spec search into arbitrary code execution if the package publisher or registry content is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.