T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
hivulseAI.py:106- Finding
Unrestricted Sensitive-File Upload and Symlink Boundary Escape
- Content
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List[str]: """Get all files under a directory while filtering selected directories.""" file_paths = [] for root, dirs, files in os.walk(directory): dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in self.exclude_dirs] for file in files: if any(file.endswith(ext) for ext in self.exclude_extensions): continue file_path = os.path.join(root, file) file_paths.append(file_path) return file_paths ``` ```python def upload_file(self, file_path: str, directory: str, branch_id: Optional[str] = None, unified_file_path: str = None) -> Dict: """Upload one file to the API.""" url = f"{self.base_url}/api/v1/claw/upload/file/" project_name = unified_file_path relative_path = os.path.relpath(file_path, directory) api_file_path = f"{project_name}/{relative_path}" with open(file_path, 'rb') as f: files = {'file': (os.path.basename(file_path), f)} data = {'file_path': api_file_path} if branch_id: data['branch_id'] = branch_id response = requests.post( url, files=files, data=data, headers=self.headers ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The uploader uses a small denylist instead of defining which files are safe to transmit. It does not exclude common sensitive material such as: - `.env` files - SSH private keys - Cloud-provider credentials - Package registry credentials - Signing keys and certificates - Database du ...[truncated 1945 chars]- Remediation
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