T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:271
- Finding
- Unpinned MobPush SDK Dependency Allows Unreviewed Supply-Chain Changes<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:271`, `SKILL.md:407-412` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party native dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown - `Podfile` 中加入 `pod 'mob_pushsdk'` ``` ```markdown 在用户确认后才执行： - `pod install` 或 `pod update` - **注意**：Ruby 4.0+ 环境下 `pod install` 可能因编码问题失败，需先设置环境变量： ```bash export LANG=en_US.UTF-8 && export LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8 pod install ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The generated CocoaPods declaration does not constrain `mob_pushsdk` to an exact, reviewed version. The workflow also permits `pod update`, which may replace a previously locked dependency with the latest version allowed by the Podfile. CocoaPods dependencies can contain native application code, transitive dependencies, resource-processing logic, and build-phase scripts. Consequently, resolving a changed or compromised release may introduce code that executes during the build or becomes embedded in the resulting application. User confirmation before dependency installation reduces accidental execution, but it does not address dependency authenticity, version mutability, or review of lockfile changes. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package, its publishing account, a transitive dependency, or the package distribution infrastructure. 2. A malicious or unexpectedly modified `mob_pushsdk` release becomes available. 3. The Skill adds the unpinned declaration `pod 'mob_pushsdk'`. 4. The user authorizes `pod install` or `pod update`. 5. CocoaPods resolves the altered dependency and modifies `Podfile.lock`. 6. Malicious native code or a build hook executes in the developer or CI environment, or is embedded in the application. 7. The payload can act with the permissions available to the build process or, after deployment, with the permissions granted to the application. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could: - Execute code under the developer or CI account d ...[truncated 484 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `mob_pushsdk` to an exact version that has been reviewed: ```ruby pod 'mob_pushsdk', 'REVIEWED_VERSION' ``` 2. Commit and review `Podfile.lock`, and fail CI when it changes without explicit dependency-review approval. 3. Use `pod install` for normal installation. Do not offer `pod update` as an interchangeable default operation. 4. Before accepting an update: - Review the resolved version and source. - Inspect all lockfile and transitive-dependency changes. - Review newly introduced build scripts. - Validate available package checksums and release signatures against trusted vendor information. 5. Restrict build jobs so dependency scripts cannot access unrelated deployment credentials or signing secrets. 6. Run dependency installation and builds in an isolated, minimally privileged environment. 7. Document the approved MobPush version and define a controlled process for security updates. ]]>