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Security audit

Interview Coach

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a local interview-coaching skill with disclosed profile and practice-history storage, and no evidence of hidden network access or malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable with the skill keeping interview-prep profile details, practice answers, scores, and weak areas in local files. Review or delete ~/.openclaw/interview-coach if you no longer want that data retained, and be aware that the broad "help" trigger may activate the skill more often than intended.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 274)May include surrounding context.

md
⭐ STAR BREAKDOWN
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

S — Situation: 8/10 ✅ Clear context
T — Task: 6/10 ⚠️ Be more specific about YOUR role
A — Action: 9/10 ✅ Great detail on what you did
R — Result: 5/10 ❌ Add numbers! "Improved efficiency" → "by 35%"

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The command list includes the generic trigger 'help,' which is so broad that it could activate during many unrelated interactions. A universal trigger substantially raises the risk of unintended invocation and unnecessary access to local files, especially in systems where skills are auto-selected from user text.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The top-level description says the skill should activate for broad phrases ending with 'or any job interview task,' which is an overly vague catch-all. Broad activation increases the chance the skill intercepts unrelated user requests and unnecessarily gains access to local interview-history/profile data in contexts the user did not clearly intend.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The skill persistently stores sensitive career-related information such as target company, experience, past roles, answers, weak areas, and interview history across sessions. While local-only persistence is less dangerous than exfiltration, retaining this data without clear minimization, retention, and consent controls can expose private user information to other local processes, users, or later unintended skill behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

First Run Setup

On first message, create data directory:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/interview-coach

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes common phrases such as 'interview tips,' 'quick prep,' and 'follow up email' that can appear in benign, unrelated conversation. This can cause over-activation, making the skill handle requests outside its intended scope and exposing or modifying persistent local data when not necessary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation says exec is needed to create the data directory, but the manifest metadata on L0004 only declares read and write. This is an active documentation-to-manifest contradiction about the skill's intended capabilities, especially because the setup instructions explicitly rely on shell execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.