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Security audit

卖家之家(跨境电商)活动查询与发布

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches its stated activity-query and publishing purpose, but it can upload user images and publish event records to a remote service without a clear final confirmation step.

Review all event fields and image files before use, and require the agent to ask for explicit confirmation before applying upload URLs or calling createActivity. Use a scoped or revocable MJZJ API key where possible.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill prescribes a full write workflow for publishing activities to a third-party service but does not require an explicit user confirmation immediately before the irreversible remote write. That creates a meaningful risk of unintended posting if the agent misinterprets user intent or proceeds from partial instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to download user-provided images and upload them to a third-party storage endpoint via putUrl without warning that files will leave the local/chat context and be transferred to external infrastructure. This can expose personal, proprietary, or sensitive image contents and metadata without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

1) 查询活动(公开)

bash
curl -X GET "https://data.mjzj.com/api/activity/query?status=recording&cityId=&position=" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

1) 查询活动(公开)

bash
curl -X GET "https://data.mjzj.com/api/activity/query?status=recording&cityId=&position=" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 124)May include surrounding context.

1) 查询活动(公开)

bash
curl -X GET "https://data.mjzj.com/api/activity/query?status=recording&cityId=&position=" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
74% confidence
Finding

This step initiates an external upload workflow that results in user-supplied files being transferred to third-party storage, but the skill does not pair it with a consent/privacy warning. The risk is not the mere use of an external endpoint, but the undocumented transmission of user content and metadata to a remote upload location.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

3) 申请上传临时文件(封面 / 详情图)

bash
curl -X POST "https://data.mjzj.com/api/common/applyUploadTempFile" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MJZJ_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

This endpoint performs a remote write that publishes activity data using an authenticated API, yet the skill lacks a required final confirmation checkpoint. In practice, that increases the chance of accidental or premature publication of user-provided event details.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 157)May include surrounding context.

4) 发布活动

bash
curl -X POST "https://data.mjzj.com/api/activity/createActivity" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MJZJ_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.