T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
BOOTSTRAP.md:18- Finding
Bootstrap Instructions Attempt to Override Agent Safety and Operational Autonomy
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This wallet skill needs review because it can sign real Web3 transactions while handling wallet secrets and local uploads in ways that are under-disclosed and unsafe.
Do not use this with a funded wallet in its current form. Before installing, require removal and rotation of hard-coded provider credentials, safer wallet signing or key storage, POST or protected input for wallet codes, explicit transaction previews for every asset-moving action, and no deletion of user-provided files unless the user approves it.
BOOTSTRAP.md:18Bootstrap Instructions Attempt to Override Agent Safety and Operational Autonomy
scripts/util/ipfs.ts:4Reusable Pinata Bearer Credential Is Hard-Coded in Source Code
scripts/config.ts:55Wallet Private Key Encryption Uses a Decryption Key Stored Beside the Ciphertext
scripts/lib/wallet.ts:9Wallet Retrieval Code Is Sent Through a URL Query Parameter
```
### Technical Analysis
The account code is used to retrieve a wallet object containing `private_key`, yet it is transmitted in a GET query string. Query parameters may be retained in HTTP access logs, reverse-proxy logs, monitoring products, browser or tooling histories, and diagnostic output. The code is also passed through `process.argv`, which can expose it through shell history and process inspection on some systems.
The code is not URL-encoded before interpolation, creating additional request-integrity problems when it contains reserved characters.
TLS protects the request in transit but does not prevent endpoint, proxy, process, or logging layers from recording the URL.
### Attack Path
1. A user provides the Moria account code.
2. The agent invokes `config:set` with the code as a command-line argument.
3. The script places the code into the wallet endpoint's query string.
4. The code is retained in shell history, process telemetry, server logs, or proxy logs.
5. An attacker with access to one of those records extracts the code.
6. If the code is reusable, the attacker calls the wallet endpoint and retrieves wallet data, potentially including private-key material.
### Impact Assessment
Depending on server-side expiration and authorization controls, the exposed code may permit retrieval of the user's wallet object and compromise of the associated signing key. Even if one-time use is enforced, the code le
...[truncated 97 chars]scripts/lib/tokens.ts:15Privy Device Identifier Is Repeatedly Transmitted in Query Strings
scripts/config.ts:22Shared Helius RPC API Key Is Embedded in Source and URL Query Strings
scripts/pool.ts:54Token Creation Deletes Uploaded Local Files Without Explicit Consent
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
If the underlying code performs third-party file upload, local file reads, IPFS URL generation, and uses hardcoded credentials while claiming to be a wallet skill, that is a serious hidden-behavior issue. This can expose local files, leak secrets to external services, and expand the attack surface far beyond user-expected blockchain operations.
The skill advertises multiple chain-affecting asset operations but does not provide a prominent overall risk warning about irreversible transactions, slippage, fraud, wallet compromise, or smart-contract risk. Users may authorize actions without understanding that mistakes can permanently lose funds.
The instructions tell the agent to execute commands directly after intent confirmation and to avoid follow-up questions for missing optional parameters. For financial operations, this weakens consent and increases the likelihood of unintended defaults, wrong assets, wrong amounts, or poor execution settings being used on irreversible transactions.
The buy/sell workflow examples use commands that contradict the documented commands, which can cause the agent to invoke the wrong operation or a non-existent script during financial transactions. In a DeFi context, command confusion can lead to failed safeguards, accidental trades, or execution of unintended scripts if similarly named handlers exist.
The sell workflow contradicts the earlier documented sell command, which is particularly dangerous because selling is irreversible and affects user holdings. A misdocumented command can produce unintended trades or invoke an alternate script with different semantics or protections.
The refund workflow contradicts the earlier documented refund command, creating ambiguity around which script actually performs the asset movement. When funds are involved, such ambiguity can result in no-op failures, invocation of the wrong script, or abuse if a typoed command resolves to a different executable path.
Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.
{
code: 6049;
name: 'failToValidateSingleSwapInstruction';
msg: 'Fail to validate single swap instruction in rate limiter';
},
{
code: 6050;
Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.
{
code: 6049;
name: 'failToValidateSingleSwapInstruction';
msg: 'Fail to validate single swap instruction in rate limiter';
},
{
code: 6050;
Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.
{
code: 6049;
name: 'failToValidateSingleSwapInstruction';
msg: 'Fail to validate single swap instruction in rate limiter';
},
{
code: 6050;
The file exposes operator/admin primitives such as config creation, operator account management, pool status changes, and fee updates that are not justified by the stated end-user skill purpose. In an agent setting, undocumented administrative transaction constructors significantly raise the risk of privilege misuse, accidental signing prompts, or covert control-plane actions against external protocols.
The SDK also exposes advanced liquidity-position, reward, vesting, split-position, and farming controls that are unrelated to simple token management as described in the manifest. In the context of a wallet-managing agent, these extra capabilities expand the action space to complex DeFi operations that can lock funds, alter positions, or incur losses well beyond what a user would reasonably expect.