T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:2691- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 2691–2718
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python The code below uses the actual `greenhelix_trading` library classes. Every method call maps to a real GreenHelix Gateway tool. Copy this module into your project, set `GREENHELIX_API_KEY` and `GREENHELIX_AGENT_ID` in your environment, and run it. """ Circuit breaker and failover system using the greenhelix_trading library. Requirements: pip install greenhelix-trading """ import os import time import json import threading from datetime import datetime, timedelta from collections import defaultdict from typing import Callable, Optional from dataclasses import dataclass, field from greenhelix_trading import HealthChecker, FleetMonitor from greenhelix_trading import CircuitBreaker, RetryPolicyTechnical Analysis
The guide directs users to install
greenhelix-tradingwithout pinning an exact version or verifying package hashes. The package is then imported into a process that readsGREENHELIX_API_KEY,GREENHELIX_AGENT_ID, and optionallyGREENHELIX_BACKUP_AGENT_ID.Because Python packages can execute code during installation and import, the effective code executed depends on whichever package release the package index resolves at installation time. A compromised publisher account, malicious future release, or package-index substitution could therefore introduce code that was not present during this Skill audit.
The dependency is relevant to the example's functionality, but accepting an unrestricted version exceeds the minimum supply-chain trust necessary to implement it. No evidence in the audited project establishes that the package itself is currently malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, distribution channel, or a future
greenhelix-tradingrelease.
...[truncated 1250 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, distribution channel, or a future
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example:
text greenhelix-trading==X.Y.Z - Distribute a lock file or hash-verified requirements file and install it using:
bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Document the official package repository and publisher identity so users can verify provenance.
- Review the pinned package and its transitive dependencies before recommending execution.
- Install and run the example in an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account.
- Use a narrowly scoped, short-lived API credential rather than a broadly capable read/write key.
- Prevent the example process from accessing unrelated secrets and files.
- Apply outbound network restrictions so the process can communicate only with explicitly required GreenHelix endpoints.
- Add dependency vulnerability and integrity checks to release maintenance procedures.
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example:
