T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:121- Finding
Gateway credentials and request data can be redirected to an arbitrary endpoint
- Content
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dict: """Execute a tool on the gateway.""" response = requests.post( f"{self.base_url}/v1", json={"tool": tool, "input": input_data}, headers=self.headers, timeout=30, ) response.raise_for_status() return response.json() ``` ### Technical Analysis The complete gateway origin is controlled by the unrestricted `GREENHELIX_API_URL` environment variable. Every request made to that origin automatically includes the reusable GreenHelix bearer token and the complete tool input. The code does not validate that the configured URL uses HTTPS or belongs to an approved GreenHelix hostname. It also does not constrain ports, user information, IP literals, or redirects. Consequently, an attacker who can influence process configuration can redirect credentials and potentially sensitive billing, customer, marketplace, and payment data to an attacker-controlled endpoint. Although support for sandbox and production endpoints is useful, allowing an arbitrary origin exceeds the minimum privilege necessary. A strict allowlist of known service origins would provide the same functionality with substantially less risk. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker gains control over deployment configuration, ...[truncated 1293 chars]- Remediation
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