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Security audit

AgentOps: Managing AI Agent Fleets in Production

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a non-executable operations guide, but its copy-ready examples use broad authenticated GreenHelix API calls that can mutate fleet, wallet, marketplace, dispute, and audit state without enough scoping or data minimization.

Install only if you are prepared to review and adapt the examples before use. Use sandbox endpoints first, least-privilege credentials, explicit tool allowlists, schema validation, redaction of secrets and personal data before audit or messaging calls, dry-run modes, human approval for financial/identity/marketplace/dispute actions, and real containment steps for pause, wallet freeze, withdrawal, and deregistration workflows.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:1476
Finding

Unredacted Tool Inputs and Agent Specifications Transmitted to an External Service

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:603
Finding

Caller-Controlled Dynamic Tool Dispatch Through a Privileged API Session

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (12)

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 999)May include surrounding context.

md
│   Tier 2   │ Reroute traffic   │ Shift load to healthy     │
│ (5-15 min) │                   │ agents, reduce task rate   │
├────────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────────┤
│   Tier 3   │ Notify + dispute  │ Send message to operator, │
│ (15-30 min)│                   │ create dispute if needed   │
├────────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────────┤
│   Tier 4   │ Freeze + escalate │ Pause agent, freeze wallet│

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The guide presents examples as educational and emphasizes a sandbox/no-key start, but it does not clearly warn that many snippets perform real state-changing, billable operations against external services if reused beyond the sandbox context. That increases the chance users will run provisioning, wallet, messaging, dispute, or audit calls without understanding the financial and operational consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 208)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 375)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 657)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 915)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1115)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1441)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1735)May include surrounding context.

python
import requests

base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"

session = requests.Session()

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The escalation table says Tier 4 should pause the agent and freeze its wallet, but the code only returns a status object and does not invoke any state-changing controls. In an incident, operators relying on this example may assume emergency containment happened when the failing or overspending agent is still active and able to continue causing SLA, cost, or compliance damage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The guide documents a graceful retirement flow that includes withdrawing remaining funds and deregistering the agent, but the sample implementation never performs those steps. If copied into production, operators may believe agents are fully decommissioned while wallets remain funded and identities/services remain active, leaving residual spend and unauthorized activity risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.