T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:1476- Finding
Unredacted Tool Inputs and Agent Specifications Transmitted to an External Service
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a non-executable operations guide, but its copy-ready examples use broad authenticated GreenHelix API calls that can mutate fleet, wallet, marketplace, dispute, and audit state without enough scoping or data minimization.
Install only if you are prepared to review and adapt the examples before use. Use sandbox endpoints first, least-privilege credentials, explicit tool allowlists, schema validation, redaction of secrets and personal data before audit or messaging calls, dry-run modes, human approval for financial/identity/marketplace/dispute actions, and real containment steps for pause, wallet freeze, withdrawal, and deregistration workflows.
SKILL.md:1476Unredacted Tool Inputs and Agent Specifications Transmitted to an External Service
SKILL.md:603Caller-Controlled Dynamic Tool Dispatch Through a Privileged API Session
Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.
│ Tier 2 │ Reroute traffic │ Shift load to healthy │
│ (5-15 min) │ │ agents, reduce task rate │
├────────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────────┤
│ Tier 3 │ Notify + dispute │ Send message to operator, │
│ (15-30 min)│ │ create dispute if needed │
├────────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────────┤
│ Tier 4 │ Freeze + escalate │ Pause agent, freeze wallet│
The guide presents examples as educational and emphasizes a sandbox/no-key start, but it does not clearly warn that many snippets perform real state-changing, billable operations against external services if reused beyond the sandbox context. That increases the chance users will run provisioning, wallet, messaging, dispute, or audit calls without understanding the financial and operational consequences.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
base_url = "https://api.greenhelix.net/v1"
api_key = "your-api-key"
session = requests.Session()
The escalation table says Tier 4 should pause the agent and freeze its wallet, but the code only returns a status object and does not invoke any state-changing controls. In an incident, operators relying on this example may assume emergency containment happened when the failing or overspending agent is still active and able to continue causing SLA, cost, or compliance damage.
The guide documents a graceful retirement flow that includes withdrawing remaining funds and deregistering the agent, but the sample implementation never performs those steps. If copied into production, operators may believe agents are fully decommissioned while wallets remain funded and identities/services remain active, leaving residual spend and unauthorized activity risk.