T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:4- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 4
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"🏰","requires":{"bins":["python"]},"install":[{"id":"pip","kind":"uv","packages":["fastapi","uvicorn","pydantic","pyyaml"]}]}}Technical Analysis
The installation metadata requests
fastapi,uvicorn,pydantic, andpyyamlwithout exact versions or integrity hashes. Consequently, separate installations can resolve to different package releases and transitive dependency trees.This does not demonstrate that any listed package is malicious. However, it creates a supply-chain weakness: a compromised future release, compromised transitive dependency, or unexpected incompatible release could be installed without a review of the newly resolved code. Integrity hashes are also absent, so the installer has no project-defined cryptographic allowlist for approved artifacts.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a listed package or one of its transitive dependencies and publishes a malicious release.
- A user installs the Skill after that release becomes eligible under unconstrained dependency resolution.
- The installer selects and downloads the affected release because no exact version or artifact hash is specified.
- Malicious package installation logic or imported runtime code executes in the installation or server process context.
This path requires an upstream package or distribution-channel compromise; the audited project itself does not retrieve or execute an explicit malicious payload.
Impact Assessment
Exploited dependency code would inherit the privileges of the user installing or running SkillGuard. Depending on those privileges and the malicious dependency behavior, the affected scope could include application data, files accessible to that account, environment variables, network ...[truncated 130 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version.
- Generate and commit a lock file that fixes the complete transitive dependency graph.
- Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded distributions where the installation system supports hash verification.
- Prefer an authenticated package index and prohibit unreviewed alternate indexes or dependency sources.
- Automate dependency vulnerability and provenance checks while requiring review before lock-file updates.
- Test upgrades in an isolated environment and deploy only approved artifacts.
- Include or explicitly declare the imported
products.skillscan,products.scopecheck, andproducts.promptguardcomponents so their provenance, versions, and implementations can be reviewed. Those modules were absent from the supplied artifact, so their internal security behavior was outside the available audit scope.
