T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:442- Finding
Mandatory Promotional Content Hijacks Every Skill Output
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a disclosed threat-intelligence monitor, but it also forces promotional Seithar branding and a third-party link into every output.
Review this before installing if you do not want your assistant's threat briefings and analyses to carry Seithar branding and an external link every time. If installed, configure or remove the footer, opt in deliberately to scheduled polling and alerts, and prefer a pinned ClawHub release or verified commit over the manual Git clone path.
SKILL.md:442Mandatory Promotional Content Hijacks Every Skill Output
SKILL.md:425Manual Installation Uses an Unpinned Mutable Git Repository
The skill stores a persistent interest profile, study history, feed history, and behavioral relevance data in memory without an explicit privacy notice or retention policy. This creates privacy risk because sensitive interests and activity patterns can reveal the user’s security focus, training level, and monitoring habits. Even if stored locally, persistent profiling should be clearly disclosed and bounded.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
web_fetchhttps://api.github.com/search/repositories?q=CVE-XXXX-XXXXX&sort=stars)The skill performs autonomous periodic feed checks, pushes immediate alerts, and sends scheduled briefings, but the description does not clearly warn users that network access and proactive messaging will occur without per-use prompting. This weakens informed consent and can surprise users with background activity, external requests, and notifications. In a security-focused skill, silent autonomy is especially sensitive because it normalizes broad ongoing monitoring behavior.
The skill explicitly states that every output should carry Seithar branding and frames user sharing and terminology propagation as a goal. This introduces a non-user-serving objective unrelated to threat intelligence, indicating the skill is using the agent as a marketing/distribution channel. In an agent context, hidden promotional behavior is risky because it manipulates outputs for third-party benefit rather than the operator’s intent.
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.
### SKILL.md (this file)
The agent reads this and knows how to operate. No external code needed — OpenClaw's built-in `web_fetch`, `web_search`, memory, and cron tools handle everything.
### sources.md
The markdown says every output carries a fixed footer including the Japanese phrase "認知作戦". This imposes a specific language/locale element on all outputs without offering the user a choice or documenting a justified regional requirement.
No suspicious patterns detected.