T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:4- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Versions Create Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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=2.0.0 requests>=2.31.0 ``` ### Technical Analysis The project specifies only minimum versions for `pandas` and `requests`. It does not use exact version pins, upper bounds, lock files, or package hashes. Consequently, `pip install -r requirements.txt` may install any future release that satisfies these constraints. This makes installations non-reproducible and expands the dependency supply-chain trust boundary beyond the versions reviewed with the project. If a future dependency release or its distribution account is compromised, users may automatically install attacker-controlled package content. The package names are legitimate and no currently malicious dependency was identified. The risk arises from unrestricted future version resolution rather than demonstrated typosquatting or dependency confusion. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publishing account, release pipeline, or distribution artifact of a permitted dependency version. 2. A user follows the documented installation command: `pip install -r requirements.txt`. 3. Package resolution selects the compromised release because it satisfies the minimum-only version constraint. 4. Malicious installation hooks or imported runtime code execute in the user's environment. 5. The payload gains the same operating-system permissions and data access as the user performing the installation or running the Skill. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary Python code execution under the installing or executing user's privileges. Depending on that account's permissions, this could expose project files, environment variables, credentials accessible to the process, and network resources. It could also allow modification of the Python environment or other user-writable files. The pro ...[truncated 115 chars]- Remediation
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