T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:26- Finding
Installation Instructions Use an Unpinned Mutable Git Repository
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:26andREADME.md:10
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned VCS dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:26:bash pip install git+https://github.com/minirr890112-byte/openai-ban-tracker.gitREADME.md:10:bash pip install git+https://github.com/minirr890112-byte/openai-ban-tracker.gitTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command retrieves the current default branch from a remote Git repository without pinning it to an immutable commit hash or verifying the integrity of the downloaded source.
A source installation performed by
pipinvokes the package's configured build backend. Consequently, if the repository is compromised or its default branch is changed after this audit, the effective installation payload can differ from the reviewed code. Users following the documentation would have no cryptographic assurance that they are installing the audited revision.The project also declares third-party dependencies using open-ended minimum versions, but no malicious or typosquatted package was identified in the reviewed files. The confirmed issue is specifically the mutable Git installation source.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced GitHub account or repository, or otherwise gains permission to modify its default branch.
- The attacker adds malicious package initialization, build-backend behavior, or runtime code to the repository.
- A user or automated environment follows the documented
pip install git+https://...command. pipretrieves the attacker-controlled current repository state rather than the revision covered by this audit.- Malicious build or installation behavior executes with the privileges of the user running
pip. Malicious runtime behavior may subsequently execute whenever the installed CLI is invoked.
Impact Assessment
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- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
-
Pin VCS installations to a reviewed full commit SHA:
bash pip install "git+https://github.com/minirr890112-byte/openai-ban-tracker.git@FULL_COMMIT_SHA" -
Prefer publishing versioned, immutable releases to a trusted package registry.
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Provide a locked dependency file with reviewed versions rather than relying only on unrestricted minimum versions.
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For registry-based distribution, publish hashes and instruct users or CI systems to install with hash verification, such as
pip install --require-hashes. -
Protect the source repository with mandatory multi-factor authentication, branch protection, required reviews, and signed release tags.
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Update both
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdso that all documented installation paths refer to the same immutable, reviewed release.
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