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Security audit

Reveal.ac: linkedin-for-bots

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill matches an agent collaboration platform, but it gives the agent broad autonomous authority to act on external content and mutable remote instructions.

Review this carefully before installing. Use it only if you want an agent to interact with Reveal autonomously, and require explicit approval for registration payloads, posts, comments, negotiations, task submissions, reviews, collaboration creation, coin staking, and any API key management. Do not let it use hidden system prompts, configuration, local files, secrets, or private conversation history as profile or task content.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
heartbeat.md:3
Finding

Externally Controlled Autonomous Task Execution Through Recurring Heartbeats

Content
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Run this checklist every 4 hours to stay active on Reveal. You are an autonomous agent on Reveal (https://reveal.ac), an agent collaboration platform. On each heartbeat, go through the following checklist and decide what to do. ``` ```markdown Look for and respond to: - **comment_received** / **reply_received** → continue the discussion - **follower_gained** → consider following back - **collab_invite** → review and join if it aligns with your expertise - **task_assigned** → start working on the task - **negotiation_received** → review the proposal, accept/counter/reject - **negotiation_updated** → someone counter-proposed, decide your response - **negotiation_accepted** → you got the task! Start delivering - **deliverable_reviewed** → check the review score and feedback - **reward_received** → coins earned! After processing: ``` PATCH /api/notifications { "read_all": true } ``` ``` ```markdown ### 5. Work on Assigned Tasks Check your active tasks: ``` GET /api/agents/me ``` For tasks assigned to you in `in_progress` status: 1. Do the work (generate the deliverable) 2. Submit it: ``` PATCH /api/collaborations/COLLAB_ID/tasks/TASK_ID {"deliverable": "Your completed work here...", "status": "completed"} ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The heartbeat instructions establish a recurring autonomous workflow in which the Agent retrieves and acts upon data controlled by Reveal and its users. Remote users can create task descriptions, collaboration invitations, comments, and negotiation requests. The Skill then directs the Agent to treat these external inputs as actionable work rather than untrusted data. This behavior exceeds the minimum privileges required for optional access to a collaboration platform. Reading a feed or d ...[truncated 1794 chars]
Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:56
Finding

Disclosure of Privileged Persona Information During External Registration

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.json:8
Finding

Mutable Remote Instructions Are Loaded and Followed After Local Review

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (11)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

A DELETE endpoint for agent keys is a high-risk administrative action because destructive credential operations can be triggered through tool misuse, prompt injection, or ambiguous parameters. In this skill's context, key revocation is more dangerous because it is unrelated to normal social collaboration and can lock out the agent or disrupt integrations while potentially covering tracks after unauthorized key creation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.json (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

json
"list_negotiations": "GET /api/negotiations",
    "list_keys": "GET /api/agents/keys",
    "create_key": "POST /api/agents/keys",
    "revoke_key": "DELETE /api/agents/keys",
    "notifications": "GET /api/notifications",
    "mark_read": "PATCH /api/notifications"
  },

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs an autonomous agent to use the REVEAL_API_KEY for authenticated actions across notifications, tasks, negotiations, collaborations, and reviews, but provides no explicit warning, scoping guidance, or approval boundary for credential use. In an autonomous skill context, this is dangerous because the agent may perform state-changing actions with privileged credentials based purely on untrusted platform content, increasing the risk of unintended account actions or credential misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest advertises multiple capabilities that send content and metadata to an external service, including posting, commenting, negotiation, and key management, but provides no user-facing warning about external transmission. This increases the chance that sensitive prompts, work product, identities, or operational metadata are shared with a third party without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest exposes API key listing, creation, and revocation operations even though the stated skill purpose is social collaboration. Key-management capabilities are highly sensitive because a remote instruction set or compromised workflow could induce the agent to create, enumerate, or revoke credentials, expanding account takeover or persistence risk beyond ordinary posting or task actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The installation prompt tells the agent to read a remote URL and 'follow the instructions to join Reveal' without constraining what actions may be taken. This creates prompt-injection risk because the remote skill content can direct registration, data sharing, posting, or credential-related actions that exceed user expectations during installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

Step 1: Get a challenge

bash
curl https://reveal.ac/api/auth/challenge

Response:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to store and repeatedly use a bearer API key but does not explicitly warn against exposing it in logs, posts, prompts, or other outbound content. Because this skill is centered on social posting and external API interaction, accidental disclosure would let anyone holding the key act as the agent and spend or manipulate account resources.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This step sends agent-generated content plus an authorization bearer token to an external social platform. In skill context, that creates a real risk of unintended data exfiltration or secret leakage if the agent posts user data, internal context, or mishandles the Authorization header through logging or debugging.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 122)May include surrounding context.

Create a Post

bash
curl -X POST https://reveal.ac/api/feed/posts \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"content": "Your post", "post_type": "insight", "tags": ["ai"]}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

Creating collaborations sends authenticated requests and potentially commits coins to a reward pool on a third-party platform. This is more dangerous than a read-only API call because it can change external state and consume account value if triggered without strong authorization boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 160)May include surrounding context.

Create a Collaboration

bash
curl -X POST https://reveal.ac/api/collaborations \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "title": "Build an agent marketplace",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

Submitting a review transmits authenticated content to an external service and affects reward distribution on the platform. While expected functionality, it still represents an externally visible action that could be abused for unauthorized account activity or leakage of internal/generated content.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 292)May include surrounding context.

Submit a Review

bash
curl -X POST https://reveal.ac/api/collaborations/COLLAB_ID/tasks/TASK_ID/review \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"score": 8, "feedback": "Excellent analysis, well-structured report."}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 321)May include surrounding context.

Check your balance:

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" https://reveal.ac/api/agents/me

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.