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Security audit

zed-hermes-acp

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only skill for connecting Hermes to Zed, with sensitive agent permissions disclosed rather than hidden.

Install only if you trust Hermes and want it available inside Zed. Keep tool permissions on confirm or narrowly scoped allow rules, avoid global auto-approve for an unsandboxed External Agent, review changes to Zed settings before saving, and remember Hermes uses its own credentials, tools, MCP configuration, and provider data policies rather than Zed's native agent controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (15)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
- To block model invocation entirely: `disable-model-invocation: true` in the skill's `SKILL.md`. `(tool-permissions.md)`

### 2.2 Rule precedence (highest -> lowest)
1. **Built-in security rules** — hardcoded, non-overridable (terminal only; e.g. `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~`, `rm -rf $HOME`, `rm -rf .`, `rm -rf ..`, any flag combo, case-insensitive, checked per sub-command). `(tool-permissions.md)`
2. `always_deny` — blocks immediately, top priority.
3. `always_confirm` — prompts even when global `default: "allow"`.
4. `always_allow` — auto-approves (unless deny/confirm also match).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
- To block model invocation entirely: `disable-model-invocation: true` in the skill's `SKILL.md`. `(tool-permissions.md)`

### 2.2 Rule precedence (highest -> lowest)
1. **Built-in security rules** — hardcoded, non-overridable (terminal only; e.g. `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~`, `rm -rf $HOME`, `rm -rf .`, `rm -rf ..`, any flag combo, case-insensitive, checked per sub-command). `(tool-permissions.md)`
2. `always_deny` — blocks immediately, top priority.
3. `always_confirm` — prompts even when global `default: "allow"`.
4. `always_allow` — auto-approves (unless deny/confirm also match).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
- To block model invocation entirely: `disable-model-invocation: true` in the skill's `SKILL.md`. `(tool-permissions.md)`

### 2.2 Rule precedence (highest -> lowest)
1. **Built-in security rules** — hardcoded, non-overridable (terminal only; e.g. `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~`, `rm -rf $HOME`, `rm -rf .`, `rm -rf ..`, any flag combo, case-insensitive, checked per sub-command). `(tool-permissions.md)`
2. `always_deny` — blocks immediately, top priority.
3. `always_confirm` — prompts even when global `default: "allow"`.
4. `always_allow` — auto-approves (unless deny/confirm also match).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
- To block model invocation entirely: `disable-model-invocation: true` in the skill's `SKILL.md`. `(tool-permissions.md)`

### 2.2 Rule precedence (highest -> lowest)
1. **Built-in security rules** — hardcoded, non-overridable (terminal only; e.g. `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~`, `rm -rf $HOME`, `rm -rf .`, `rm -rf ..`, any flag combo, case-insensitive, checked per sub-command). `(tool-permissions.md)`
2. `always_deny` — blocks immediately, top priority.
3. `always_confirm` — prompts even when global `default: "allow"`.
4. `always_allow` — auto-approves (unless deny/confirm also match).

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 185)May include surrounding context.

md
`~/.var/app/dev.zed.Zed/config/zed/settings.json` (unless a custom
  `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`). Not the macOS/Windows paths.
- **Zed settings.json is JSONC** (Flatpak and native) — Hermes's `write_file`/
  `patch` tools do strict-JSON validation and **refuse to write it** (the `//`
  comments fail the check). Edit with a tolerant method (python anchor-replace;
  see `references/zed-flatpak-setup.md`). Never use a JSON-only writer that
  would strip Zed's comments.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-ai-features.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Layout**: title-bar menu *Panel Layout > Agentic* (or `workspace: use agentic layout`); restore with *Classic*.
- **Switch threads**: click in sidebar, or `ctrl-tab` / `Shift+ctrl-tab` to cycle recent threads (works from Agent Panel too).
- **Thread History**: `ctrl-g` or clock icon. Archive (hover archive icon / `Shift+Backspace`), restore, or permanently delete (trash — unrecoverable). Fuzzy search on titles.
- **Multiple projects**: *Add Project* button (open-folder icon) in bottom bar → recent / Add Local Folders / Add Remote Folder. Multi-root folder projects let one thread read/write across folders.
- **New thread in a project**: hover project header `+`, or `agents sidebar: new thread in group`.
- **Thread types**: Zed Agent thread (Zed settings/profiles/tools/MCP) · External Agent thread (**ACP + Hermes native config**) · Terminal Thread (CLI owns auth).
- **Worktree isolation**: start a thread in a new Git worktree for isolated checkout; detached HEAD by default. Moving a finished thread to history saves/restores its worktree.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes zed --uninstall, described as removing Zed and all related files, but provides no warning about data loss, scope of removal, or the irreversible nature of the action. Under the markdown-specific warning criteria, destructive behavior that could affect system integrity should be accompanied by an explicit caution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-flatpak-setup.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

settings.json is JSONC

Zed's settings file is JSONC: // line comments + trailing commas. Hermes's write_file/patch tools run strict JSON validation and will REFUSE to write it (JSONDecodeError on the comments). Workarounds:

  • Edit with a tolerant method on the host (the file is a normal file at ~/.var/app/.../settings.json) — anchor-replace preserves structure:
    python

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

md
1. **Built-in security rules** — hardcoded, non-overridable (terminal only; e.g. `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~`, `rm -rf $HOME`, `rm -rf .`, `rm -rf ..`, any flag combo, case-insensitive, checked per sub-command). `(tool-permissions.md)`
2. `always_deny` — blocks immediately, top priority.
3. `always_confirm` — prompts even when global `default: "allow"`.
4. `always_allow` — auto-approves (unless deny/confirm also match).
5. Tool-specific `default` (e.g. `tools.terminal.default`).
6. Global `default` (`tool_permissions.default`; `"confirm"` is the default). `(tool-permissions.md)`

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The document explicitly recommends a global configuration with tool_permissions.default: "allow" for an external agent that is not OS-sandboxed. In this skill context, that materially lowers user confirmation barriers for terminal, file-write, delete, fetch, and other sensitive actions, increasing the chance that prompt injection or agent mistakes lead to harmful autonomous execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

5. Quick config shapes (Linux, External Agent context)

  • Hermes-relevant: tool_permissions still gate Hermes; tune tools.terminal/edit_file/write_file/delete_path/fetch rules. Sandboxing does not wrap Hermes.
  • Global auto-approve (most tools, except deny/confirm/built-ins/settings dirs):
    json
    { "agent": { "tool_permissions": { "default": "allow" } } }
    

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/zed-tools-permissions.md (reported line 123)May include surrounding context.

{ "agent": { "tool_permissions": { "default": "allow" } } }

text
- Protect sensitive files via `edit_file`/`write_file` `always_deny` patterns (`.env`, `secrets?/`, `\.(pem|key)$`). `(tool-permissions.md)`
- Enable Linux sandbox for **Zed Agent** (not Hermes): install non-setuid `bwrap` (`sudo apt install bubblewrap` + AppArmor profile on Ubuntu). `(sandboxing.md#installing-bubblewrap)`

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This markdown file directs the user to modify settings.json / JSONC under agent_servers, which is a user-data-affecting operation. While the procedure explains how to make the edit, it does not include a direct caution to back up the file or note that malformed JSON/JSONC could disrupt Zed's configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This markdown file provides a concrete file-edit recipe, including Python that overwrites ~/.var/app/dev.zed.Zed/config/zed/settings.json, but it does not warn that the operation changes user configuration and may remove comments or alter existing settings. For markdown files, SQP-2 applies when descriptions omit warnings about behaviors that can affect user data or system integrity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The manifest description implies a narrow integration role: connecting Hermes Agent to Zed using the Agent Client Protocol. The documentation additionally highlights that Hermes can read projects outside the home directory due to a broader runtime grant, which goes beyond the minimal behavior implied by the skill description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The stated purpose is to connect Hermes Agent to Zed, for which documenting access to arbitrary paths like /mnt or /srv is not obviously necessary. Calling out that Hermes can read those locations introduces a capability not justified by the manifest's narrowly scoped integration description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.