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Security audit

single-gpu-passthrough

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed guide and script set for single-GPU VM passthrough, but it requires root-level host changes that can shut down the desktop while the VM starts.

Install only if you intentionally want this machine to use single-GPU passthrough and have verified the VM name, PCI device IDs, display manager, and script paths. Starting the configured VM can terminate the active graphical session and unsaved desktop work, so test from a secondary console or remote shell and keep a recovery path before enabling the hook.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (11)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 298)May include surrounding context.

md
<topology sockets="1" dies="1" cores="6" threads="2"/>
  </cpu>
  <devices>
    <!-- VFIO GPU Passthrough -->
    <hostdev mode="subsystem" type="pci" managed="yes">
      <source>
        <address domain="0x0000" bus="0x01" slot="0x00" function="0x0"/>

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

Kernel parameters are set via rpm-ostree kargs (NOT /etc/default/grub — bootc is immutable):

bash
sudo rpm-ostree kargs \
  --append='intel_iommu=on' \
  --append='iommu=pt' \
  --append='rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau' \

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 230)May include surrounding context.

Kernel parameters are set via rpm-ostree kargs (NOT /etc/default/grub — bootc is immutable):

bash
sudo rpm-ostree kargs \
  --append='intel_iommu=on' \
  --append='iommu=pt' \
  --append='rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau' \

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

md
- `/etc` is writable (persists across updates)
- `/usr` is immutable (resets on each deployment update)
- Kernel params are applied via `rpm-ostree kargs` — add/remove requires a reboot
- To add: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --append='new_param=value'`
- To remove: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --delete='old_param=value'`
- To replace: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --replace='old=value' --replace-to='new=value'`
- To view: `rpm-ostree kargs`

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

md
- `/etc` is writable (persists across updates)
- `/usr` is immutable (resets on each deployment update)
- Kernel params are applied via `rpm-ostree kargs` — add/remove requires a reboot
- To add: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --append='new_param=value'`
- To remove: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --delete='old_param=value'`
- To replace: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --replace='old=value' --replace-to='new=value'`
- To view: `rpm-ostree kargs`

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

md
- `/etc` is writable (persists across updates)
- `/usr` is immutable (resets on each deployment update)
- Kernel params are applied via `rpm-ostree kargs` — add/remove requires a reboot
- To add: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --append='new_param=value'`
- To remove: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --delete='old_param=value'`
- To replace: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --replace='old=value' --replace-to='new=value'`
- To view: `rpm-ostree kargs`

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 463)May include surrounding context.

md
- `/etc` is writable (persists across updates)
- `/usr` is immutable (resets on each deployment update)
- Kernel params are applied via `rpm-ostree kargs` — add/remove requires a reboot
- To add: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --append='new_param=value'`
- To remove: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --delete='old_param=value'`
- To replace: `sudo rpm-ostree kargs --replace='old=value' --replace-to='new=value'`
- To view: `rpm-ostree kargs`

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a startup hook that stops the display manager, kills multiple user processes with SIGKILL, unbinds consoles/framebuffer, unloads GPU drivers, and hands the only GPU to a VM, but it does not prominently warn that this will terminate the active desktop session and can disrupt running applications. In an agent-skill context, presenting these steps as routine automation without strong gating increases the chance of accidental host denial-of-service or data loss from forcibly terminated user processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 230)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Become root
sudo -i

# Copy scripts
cp ~/projects/single-gpu-passthrough/hooks/vfio-startup ~/.local/sbin/vfio-startup

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

md
# Make executable
chmod +x ~/.local/sbin/vfio-startup ~/.local/sbin/vfio-teardown /etc/libvirt/hooks/qemu

# Create log file
mkdir -p /var/log/libvirt
touch /var/log/libvirt/custom_hooks.log /var/log/libvirt/vfio-startup.log /var/log/libvirt/vfio-teardown.log

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This shell script starts/stops services and invokes external scripts via subprocess execution, which can affect system state. The file contains no confirmation prompt, user-facing disclosure, or explanatory comment/docstring warning about these actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.