T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
dashboard_server.py:872- Finding
Unauthenticated Administrative API Exposed on All Network Interfaces
- Content
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', methods=['DELETE']) def delete_agent_endpoint(agent_name): if not _validate_agent_name(agent_name): abort(400, "Invalid agent name") try: result = openclaw_config_manager.delete_agent(agent_name) return jsonify(result) except Exception as e: return jsonify({"success": False, "error": str(e)}), 500 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Flask application binds to every interface while implementing no login mechanism, bearer-token validation, session authorization, request-signature validation, or authorization middleware. Network access to port 5181 is therefore sufficient to invoke privileged API operations. The exposed API can read OpenClaw session information and system paths, update dashboard and OpenClaw configuration, create or delete agents, modify subagent permissions, enable or disable skills, upload files, and initiate skill installation. This contradicts the documentation statement that authentication is inherited from OpenClaw. The dashboard is a separate Flask application and contains no implementation that performs such inheritance. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker discovers TCP port 5181 on a host running the dashboard. 2. The attacker requests `/api/agents` or `/api/system-info` without credentials to enumerate agents and installation paths. 3. The attacker submits unauthenticated POST or DELETE request ...[truncated 666 chars]- Remediation
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